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Federal Laboratories of Democracy
HannahJ. Wisemant* and Dave Owen**
Facilitating state policy experimentation is an oft-cited justification for
the United States' federalism system. Despite growing recognition of risk
aversion, free riding, and other disincentives to state-led experimentation,
the mythology of state laboratories still dominates the discourse of
federalism. We propose a framework that counters this entrenched
assumption and enables more productive analysis of policy
experimentation. The Article explores a continuum of experimental
approaches that differ in terms of the experimental rigor they incorporate
and the governance levels at which they are designed and implemented.
We apply this new analytical framework to case studies from divergent
policy areas, including agricultural, natural resources, education, and
welfare law. These examples highlight rigorous experiments designed and
largely administered by federal agencies.
Our framework and case studies turn the concept of the "laboratories of
the states" on its head, showing that experimentation can, often does, and
should occur at multiple levels, including the federal level. In countering
and adding nuance to traditional experimentation accounts, the Article
reveals the benefits of federal involvement in policy experiments. Thus, it
highlights the perils of weakening federal authority or excluding federal
involvement in an effort to enhance core federalism values like
experimentation. Federal expertise and resources - and even the simple
availability of experimental platforms, such as federally-owned and
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managed lands - often give the federal government a comparative
advantage in the policy experimentation field. This is not to say that the
federal government should always lead and implement experiments, but it
calls attention to the importance of understanding experimentation as a
multi-level endeavor that extends well beyond the states.
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INTRODUCTION
An oft-cited justification for federalism is that it induces creative
policy experimentation at the state level.1 According to the standard
arguments, limiting federal power and protecting state sovereignty
allow states to function as "laboratories of democracy," places where
governmental innovations can begin and spread.2 For courts and
federalism scholars, this alleged virtue has remained alluring for
decades, and celebrations of state policy laboratories remain a central
theme in the discourse of federalism.3 Similarly, much of the literature
on policy experimentation tends to assume, if it confronts questions of
federalism at all, that states (and sometimes local government) will be
the experimenters.4
I See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929,
946 (2011) (noting and critiquing "a frequent justification of federalism - that
allowing states to make independent choices provides a kind of laboratory to test
policies"). Of course, scholars and courts point to a variety of other potential reasons
to concentrate or decentralize power, such as efficiency and responsiveness to local
concerns. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6, 47-48 (2010) (describing the many traditional justifications for
federalism). This Article focuses solely on the oft-cited "laboratories" virtue of
federalism.
2 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing states as "laborator[iesl"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 493 (1954) ("The federal
system has the immense advantage of providing forty-eight separate centers for ...
[legislative] experimentation.").
3 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2673 (2015) ("This Court has 'long recognized the role of the States as
laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems."' (quoting Oregon v. Ice,
555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009))); Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism
and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1752-75 (2004) (describing courts'
reliance on this justification).
4 See, e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 12 (1972) (arguing that a
decentralized system of governance can generate "greater experimentation and
innovation in the production of public goods"); Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman,
Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation, 4 Q.J. POL. Sci. 35, 35-36 (2009)
(noting that "political decentralization has been widely thought to stimulate policy
experimentation and innovation"); Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, On the
Incentives to Experiment in Federations, 60 J. URB. EcoN. 484, 484 (2006) ("A
commonly held view is that fiscal federalism promotes innovative public programs,
[and] speeds up the process of policy experimentation and its diffusion."). But see
Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1120, 1133
(1999) (acknowledging that centralized governments can also experiment). There is a
broad literature closely investigating states' experimentation with policy and
documenting what the authors believe to be diffusion of that policy, although the
extent to which this experimentation and diffusion occurs is disputed. For literature
investigating what authors believe to be evidence of experimentation and diffusion,
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Yet there are many reasons to be skeptical of these accounts. While
no one disputes that state and local governments sometimes do
innovate, a variety of characteristics of state and local governments
make it unlikely that they will experiment nearly as often as
traditional federalism theory would assume.5 Even when they do
experiment, other state and local government characteristics may
hinder good policies' paths to wider adoption.6 Consequently, if we
value policy laboratories, then it is important to consider how other
elements of our federalist system can enable policy experimentation or
something closer to that ideal. This endeavor is particularly valuable
in an era of political upheaval and growing calls for massive reduction
see, e.g., ANDREw KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE
AMERICAN STATES (2007) (arguing that effective innovation and diffusion of policy
occurs within and across state lines); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State
Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. Sa. REV.
395, 410-11 (1990) (concluding on the basis of an empirical model that states
sometimes overcome obstacles to innovation); Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs
and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. Sa. 738, 738-39 (1997) (summarizing
the broad political science literature on policy innovation and diffusion).
5 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY
& TRAGIC COMPROMISE 26-29 (2008) [hereinafter FEDERALISM] (challenging the
common "laboratories-of-the-states" justification for federalism and other common
alleged virtues of federalism); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?
Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1370, 1398 (2009)
(concluding that "there is social underprovision of experimentation by small
jurisdictions," that "the quality of the information generated ... is likely below the
theoretical ideal," and that "absent outside intervention, state and local governments
will on the whole innovate at well below the socially optimal level"); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 593 (1980) (concluding that due to risk aversion, free riding, and other
problems there is unlikely to be much efficient innovation purely at the local level);
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 913 (1994) [hereinafter Federalism: Some Notes] (arguing that
federalism "only makes sense" when individuals in different regions have different
rights-based preferences because the federal government could just as easily "choose
more effective instrumentalities" for reaching a particular goal and "adapt the selected
instrumentalities to local circumstances"); Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government
Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208 (2002)
(noting that "a local policyrnaker may free-ride off his neighbor's experiment").
6 See, e.g., Berry & Berry, supra note 4, at 401-05 (describing factors that hinder
or impede innovation and diffusion in the state lottery context, such as the financial
health of the state and the percentage of the population that adheres to fundamentalist
religious views, as well as whether the proposed adoption is in an election year and
involves re-election of incumbents); Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion
Study, 67 AM. POL. SC. REV. 1174, 1176, 1185 (1973) (noting that "diffusion patterns
do differ by issue area and by degree of federal involvement" and that "[hlard-to-
amend limitations in the state's constitution or values of the political subculture might
causes a state's leaders to be practically immune to diffusion from interaction").
1122 [Vol. 52:1119
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in federal governmental "interference."7 If states are not the optimal
experimenters, then broad-based shrinkage of federal involvement
could reverse critical policy experimentation, thus undermining a
virtue often used to justify state power.8
This Article responds to the challenge of constructing useful policy
laboratories and the inadequacies of traditional theories through closer
attention to the intersections of experimentation and federalism. We
craft a conceptual framework to fuse key attributes of policy
experimentation with the United States' federalist system. We then
flesh out this framework and demonstrate its analytical capacity by
discussing several real-world policy initiatives. The governance
structures for the policy initiatives we describe are all quite different
from the stereotypical "laborator[ies] of the states." They also are
directly at odds with the popular myth that "the central government
can examine only one policy at a time and so will slowly uncover
superior new policy choices."9 Instead, these experiments involve the
federal government in both designing and implementing experiments,
sometimes without much help from the states, and sometimes relying
on state and local entities to cooperate in experiments facilitated by
the federal government.10
Our core thesis is that these governance structures for
experimentation are not anomalous. In a federalist system of
hierarchical and decentralized governance, a key driver of
experimentation often will, and should, be the federal government."
7 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017)
(announcing a broad initiative to reduce government involvement in numerous policy
areas).
8 For example, in the context of controlling water pollution, Michael Livermore
argues that reducing federal jurisdiction over waters "would hamper, rather than
facilitate, beneficial experimentation." Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of
Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 644 (2017).
9 Strumpf, supra note 5, at 208 (summarizing, though not adopting, this
widespread view).
10 There is an extensive literature on federal-local collaboration, but this literature
has not tended to focus on how the federal government enlists local governments or
works at the local level to conduct policy experimentation. See, e.g., Nestor M.
Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959 (2007).
11 The political science literature has made this observation, but it rarely arises in
the legal literature, and courts continue to follow the opposite assumption. For
arguments in the political science context suggesting that centralization can generate
more - and sometimes too much - experimentation, see, e.g., Cai & Treisman,
supra note 4, at 36 (observing that "[e]xplicitly experimental local policies occur in
both centralized dictatorships and centralized democracies"); Kotsogiannis &
2018]1 1123
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Furthermore, federal initiatives sometimes incorporate attributes that
make policy experimentation surprisingly rigorouS12 - far more
rigorous than the haphazard patchwork of state policies that arise
from the decentralized experimentation envisioned by most federalism
proponents.
Our primary case study, which has attracted scant attention in the
legal literature, explores ambitious experiments in U.S. agricultural
policy that evolved over nearly a century. The experiments began with
a federally-designed and federally-implemented approach. The federal
government used congressionally-approved funding to employ a true
boots-on-the-ground system for modifying crop management practices
that contributed to massive dust storms and loss of valuable topsoil.
The United States Department of Agriculture sent federal agents to far-
flung rural locations to build experimental research stations that tested
and demonstrated improved soil conservation techniques to farmers.13
The federal government also enlisted the Civilian Conservation Corps
to implement these techniques around the country, with approaches
that varied by region.14 The scientific elements of this program were
thoroughly intertwined with policy experimentation. Federal on-the-
ground learning extended to political and social questions, like
determining how to achieve farmer buy-in once effective techniques
had been identified.1 5 Further, these efforts informed the development
Schwager, supra note 4, at 484-85 (arguing that "a decentralized system is conducive
to producing fewer policy innovations than a centralized one"). This literature tends
to use models to assess the likelihood of experimentation rather than to discuss
governance structures and the mechanics.
12 See infra Part III.B.
13 See infra Part III.B.1.
14 See infra Part III.B.1.
15 See, e.g., Douglas Helms, The Civilian Conservation Corps: Demonstrating the
Value of Soil Conservation, 40 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 184, 186 (1985)
[hereinafter The Civilian Conservation] (noting early efforts to persuade farmers to
adopt recommendations for soil conservation measures through cooperative
agreements, in which the government supplied some of the materials necessary for
implementing the measures and the farmers committed to implement the measures);
id. at 185-86 (noting a local soil conservation demonstration district director's intent
to "demonstrate proper farm management," and an early soil conservation leader's
goal of demonstrating "the values of conservation on an area larger than the individual
farm"); Douglas Helms, Two Centuries of Soil Conservation, 5 OAH MAG. HIST. 24, 26
(1991) [hereinafter Two Centuries] (noting policy efforts by the Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture to form an alternative to the solely federally-run demonstration projects in
order to spread conservation practices "nationwide and have an impact on the way
people farmed" by getting farmers "more interested and involved in ... the work");
H.H. Bennett, Conservation Work of the Department of Agriculture, Speech at
Raleigh, North Carolina 10-11 (Nov. 1, 1940) [hereinafter Conservation Work]
1124 [Vol. 52:1119
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of agency policies and laws. These early federal initiatives have since
morphed into a complex federal-state-local program that involves
rigorous experimentation, including clear standards for agricultural
conservation policies, sophisticated approaches for measuring the
results of federally-supported conservation practices, and hundreds of
scientific papers reporting on results and suggesting how conservation
practices could improve.16
Other examples that we explore here, such as federal agencies'
evolving policies for wildfire management7 and the United States
Department of Education's Race to the Top,18 demonstrate that the soil
conservation story has parallels in other fields.'9 Each program has
been different, yet these projects share an activist federal role not just
in funding innovation or compiling data, but also in selecting
hypotheses and sometimes carrying out the actual experiments. In
combination, these examples illustrate the possibility, and explore the
merits, of policy approaches that fall at previously underappreciated
points within our experimentation framework. They show the value,
in other words, of taking the laboratories of democracy concept well
beyond state (and local) government. And they show the perils of
judicial, legislative, and academic tendencies to equate policy
experimentation exclusively with sub-federal governance.
To begin the project of melding experimental policy design with
federalism and producing meaningful lessons for policy
experimentation, Part I reviews existing literature. We describe four
literatures that dance around the role of federal experimentation: the
traditional federalism literature, which tends to assume that state
experimentation flows naturally from a federalist system; the
experimental design and adaptive management literatures, which
focus on experimental systems without grounding their analyses in
federalist structures; and the experimental governance literature,
which attempts to marry federalism and experimentation yet discounts
the experimental potential of the federal government itself.20 Part II
(noting Soil Conservation Service field stations, at which the government was
investigating "[ulnder actual field conditions ... the economic aspects of conservation
farming" in addition to scientific questions such as "the relation between farming
practices and sedimentation of stream channels [and] reservoirs") (transcript available
in the Iowa State University Special Collections and University Archives Department).
16 See infra Part III.B.1.
1 See infra Part III.C.
1 See infra Part III.D.
19 We make no claim, of course, that our examples exhaust the field of federal
experimentation.
20 For a very rare exception to these generalizations, see Joseph Landau,
2018]1 1125
University of California, Davis
explains why the gaps in these bodies of literature are important. After
describing what we mean by experimentation, we explore the
challenges of fitting real experimental policy approaches into a state-
centric federalist structure. In light of the substantial room for
improvement identified in Parts I and II, in Part III we provide an
analytical framework of governance and policy experimentation. This
Part includes approaches that incorporate different degrees of
experimental rigor and that rely on varying levels of federal
involvement. We then apply this framework to case studies and
examples, showing how the typology can shift focus to more
productive arrangements for experimental governance.
Finally, Part IV draws generalizable lessons. We offer no magic
formula. Instead, the analysis in Part III shows that effective
governance has flowed from experiments conducted by the federal
government and from experiments designed by the federal
government and implemented by state and local actors with federal
guidance. A single level of government is not universally superior in
terms of differentiating the experiment or measuring, collecting, and
reporting data. Indeed, recent hreatened federal intervention in some
policy areas could interfere with key state and local experiments.21
Nevertheless, the federal government brings key advantages to policy
experimentation, including, most importantly, the resources at its
disposal and its combination of centralized coordination and partially
decentralized operations. And even when the federal government lacks
the money, staff, and expertise to implement an experiment itself, it
can play an important role in harnessing resources at other levels,
coordinating the experiment, and initiating productive reporting of
lessons learned across local and state borders.22
Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173
(2016). Landau explains how federal immigration policies illustrate the possibility of
federal experimentation, while also noting that "[m]any of the mechanisms associated
with more experimental regimes remain untapped within federal immigration law." Id.
at 1238.
21 See, e.g., Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017); Vill. of Old
Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163 & No. 17 CV 1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at *6
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017). Both cases address whether the Federal Power Act preempts
state clean energy initiatives. Although the court in Zibelman do not find preemption,
plaintiffs have appealed the case. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 567.
22 This supports earlier, similar suggestions by scholars such as Ed Rubin,
Malcolm Feeley, and Michael Livermore, who pointed out that the federal government
can help coordinate experiments. See, e.g., Livermore, supra note 8, at 644 (briefly
arguing in favor of "managed experimentation," in which the federal government,
states, and local governments all play a role); Rubin & Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes,
1126 [Vol. 52:1119
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The lessons from Part IV have important implications not just for
federalism theorists, but also, more practically, for legislators, judges,
and advocates. Legislators often draft statutory provisions designed to
facilitate policy innovation, often looking exclusively to states to
supply that innovation. "Big waivers" are just one prominent example
of this phenomenon.23 Our analysis reveals that state focus to be
overly myopic; legislators also should consider using the federal
government itself to pursue policy experiments. Similarly, courts often
invoke policy experimentation as a rationale for limiting federal
authority.24 That rationale, we show, is also often misguided. For
advocates, the lessons are more nuanced. Persuading any level of
government to adopt experimental policies is difficult. Thus, an
advocate's best option will usually be the governance level that is
willing to try, not the one that would be the optimal locus of policy
experimentation in some perfect world. Beggars, after all, cannot be
choosers. Nevertheless, would-be policy entrepreneurs still should
keep the federal government in mind as a possible focus, and
sometimes the preferred focus, of advocacy.
Intentional policy experimentation - no matter the governance
level at which it occurs - rarely matches the type of carefully-planned
experimentation that occurs in a scientific laboratory. Indeed,
although Justice Brandeis, in coining the famous laboratories term,
likely envisioned something close to a true experiment,25 the case law
and literature that followed used the term increasingly loosely. But
defining a new space for policy experimentation broadens
opportunities for designing meaningful and more effective
supra note 5, at 924 (describing how the federal government could coordinate
experiments and vary approaches by locality or region).
23 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 271 (2013) (describing the granting of waivers to states as a way to induce
policy experimentation).
24 See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
25 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997)
("'Innovation' might have been a better word choice for Justice Brandeis than
'experimentation,' saving us all a lot of bother."). But see Althouse, supra note 3, at
1751 ("Justice Brandeis does not appear to view 'experimentation' as a metaphor. His
government policymakers operate 'in the fields of social and economic science."').
Indeed, Justice Brandeis introduced this term during a period of close attention to
policy experimentation that borrowed directly from science. See generally JOHN
DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938) (arguing for scientifically-driven and
empirically-supported social policy); Foreword, Symposium on Cooperative Federalism,
23 IOWA L. REv. 455 (1938) (discussing policy experimentation in a traditional
experimental light).
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experiments at several levels of government, far beyond a simplified
state-centric approach.
1. EXPERIMENTALISM AND FEDERALISM: AN OVERVIEW
For decades, the Supreme Court has spoken of federalism and
experimentation in the same breath.26 Academics often echo the
judicial statements and sometimes elaborate upon them.27 But most
exploration of the intersections of federalism and experimentalism has
remained relatively cursory, even as federalism has remained a central
focus of legal-academic inquiry, and as sophisticated schools of
thought have grown up around the idea of experimental governance.
Academics and judges do routinely discuss governance innovations
instigated by the federal government, including the federal
government's facilitation of sub-federal experimentation.28 But when
they turn from specific examples to broader theories, their discussions
typically adopt fairly simplistic models of experimentalism or
federalism - or both - and the federal government is often viewed as
no more than a facilitator or coordinator of sub-federal experiments.
This Part introduces this theoretical background. We begin with the
Supreme Court's discussions of the laboratories of democracy and
then turn to key areas of academic literature that consider the
intersections of federalism and experimentalism. Each area, we show,
26 See Livermore, supra note 8, at 648 ("Within legal scholarship, experimentation
is often understood through the lens of federalism.").
27 In work that comes closer to recognizing the role of the federal government in
initiating policy innovation, Ann Carlson notes how the federal government and states
sometimes trade off roles over time, with either the states or federal government
pushing for innovative policy changes. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and
Climate Change, 103 Nw. U.L. REv. 1097, 1098-1100 (2009).
28 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. LOWRY, THE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM: STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES 15-16 (1992) (noting that federal
leadership can push state innovation and diffusion of innovation, in that "[cihange
through dispersion and emulation of innovation is fostered by open lines of
communication that can be maintained by vertical hierarchy," with vertical hierarchy
referring to federal intervention); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of
Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV.
810, 817 (2016) (noting federal "intentional policy nudges and subsidies to push
states to innovate" toward low-carbon energy policy and exploring these "nudges" in
depth); Susan Welch & Kay Thompson, The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy
Innovation, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715, 727 (1980) (concluding that "incentives provided
by the federal government do stimulate the diffusion of [innovative] policies through
the states"); infra sources cited note 57 (describing more sources that have focused on
the government as an experiment facilitator); infra source cited note 60 and
accompanying text.
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does not grapple with some of the key complexities of the intersecting
terrain of experimental design and a federalist governmental structure.
A. Experimentalism and Traditional Federalism Theory
In 1932, a dispute over Oklahoma's regulation of ice companies
reached the United States Supreme Court. In a forgettable opinion, a
majority of the Court set the regulatory controls aside.29 justice
Brandeis dissented. The nation then was deep in the Great Depression
- "an emergency more serious than war," in Brandeis' words.30 As he
acknowledged, the path out of those dark times was far from clear.3 1
Brandeis was sure of one thing, however: "There must be power in the
states and the nation to remould, through experimentation, our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs."32 That capacity for experimentation, he noted, was
closely tied to federalism. "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system," he wrote, "that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."33
That sentence has become iconic.34 The Court often quotes it, or, in
more shorthand form, refers to "laboratories for experimentation."35
The references come in opinions by liberals and conservative justices
alike and in cases addressing a wide variety of subject matter.36 On an
29 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-80 (1932).
30 Id. at 306 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 309 ("Whether [the view that increased regulation of economic
competition is necessary] is sound nobody knows. The objections to the proposal are
obvious and grave.").
32 Id. at 311.
33 Id.
34 Other justices had said similar things, but with less memorable phrasing. See,
e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (lamenting
use of the Fourteenth Amendment to "prevent the making of social experiments that
an important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several states").
35 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016); Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015); see, e.g., Oregon
v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 & n.20 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947).
36 See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1141 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[Als the Court recently reminded us, States are free to serve as
'laboratories' of democracy." (quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2673)). The
Court's Arizona State Legislature opinion, which Justice Ginsburg authored, in turn
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often-divided Court, the value of state laboratories is one thing
everyone can agree on.37 Yet the judicial references also are strikingly
brief. Absent from the Court's opinions is any effort to explore the
nuances of these state laboratories, or to define in any detail the
conditions that allow them to succeed in fulfilling their celebrated role
(let alone to make satisfaction of those conditions a factor as the Court
weighs the legality of state action). Nor has the Court done much. to
extend its discussion of the laboratories of democracy to the many
non-state governing entities that populate our federalist system.38 The
implicit assumptions, instead, appear to be that experimentalism will
automatically emerge from federalist governance and that the locus of
experimentation will be the states.
A similar theme emerges from much of the classic academic work
on federalism.39 Academic scholars repeatedly identify federalism with
policy experimentation. This tendency dominates scholarly work by
dual federalists, who argue that a strong separation between federal
and state powers facilitates experimentation,40 and from "dynamic" or
"interactive" federalists, who argue that overlap between federal and
state powers similarly enables and strengthens policy
experimentation.41 Indeed, the latter literatures, which address
cooperative federalism and other variations from the traditional dual-
federalist theme, often acknowledge the importance of federal
involvement in experimentation and policy innovation, but typically
as a facilitator or trigger, not initiator, of experiments.42 Work by both
quotes Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
581 (1995), for the same proposition. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2673.
37 While everyone may agree on the principle, it nevertheless tends to pop up in
dissents. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 957 (2016)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
38 For a very rare example of the Court applying this reasoning to a local
government, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 49-50 (noting "[a]n analogy
to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system").
39 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 25, at 399 ("Common intuition suggests that the
vast majority of techniques used today to govern were developed at the state and local
level.").
40 See Livermore, supra note 8, at 648-49 (summarizing and citing scholarship in
this realm); see also Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that protecting "historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal
encroachment" allows states to function as laboratories of democracy).
41 See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889, 1902 (2014) (summarizing and citing multiple sources in this vein).
42 See, e.g., LOWRY, supra note 28, at 15 ("Vertical involvement [by the federal
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schools of thought rarely attends to either the actual mechanics of
experimentation or the experimental possibilities of federal
governance.43 One could form the impression that state-centered
experimentalism will spring naturally, like weeds in well-watered and
fertile soil, from the policy differentiation and intergovernmental
interaction that federalism creates. There are, of course, exceptions to
this generalization, which we discuss in more detail below. But for the
most part, traditional federalism theories have celebrated state
experimentation while ignoring its mechanics.
B. Experimental Design and Adaptive Management
While federalism theory devotes only fleeting attention to the
methods of governmental experimentation, other bodies of theory
have made such experimentation their central focus, but often with
scant attention to the governance structures at the heart of federalism
theory. Two bear mention here.
The first area of work, which for simplicity we will call the
experimental design literature, focuses on improving the frequency
and rigor of policy experiments.44 Some articles at the edges of this
government through cooperative federalism] affects state leadership. State leadership
involves cooperation in, competition over, and dissemination of innovations and
effective practices. Federal intervention can facilitate coordination and
communication of state efforts."); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1287 (2009) (arguing that cooperative
federalism facilitates states' proposed policy variations).
43 See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REv. 58, 113-14
(2016) [hereinafter Regional Federal Administration] (noting that conventional schools
of federalist thought often assume effective communication among levels of
government). For an exception, see Landau, supra note 20, finding hints of an
experimental federal role in immigration policy. Some environmental federalism work
has focused on ways in which federal, state, local, and sometimes foreign governments
can facilitate the spread of policy innovations. This work acknowledges the possibility
of experiments beginning with the federal government. See, e.g., Boyd & Carlson,
supra note 28; Kirsten H. Engel, Democratic Environmental Experimentalism, 35 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57, 70-71 (2017). But none of this work focuses on either the
historic reality of federal experimentation or the advantages the federal government
brings to developing experimental policy.
See generally Abramowicz et al., supra note 1 (explaining how statistical
research should be conducted to influence policy); Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review
Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2017). Kenneth Abbott
and Duncan Snidal's work bridges this area and the experimentalist governance
literature, which we discuss in more detail below. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Experimentalist Governance 2.0: Scientific Inquiry and Policy Learning
(unpublished draft on file with authors) (describing different types of experiments
and briefly exploring the "experimentalist governance process"); see also ROBERT A.
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vein just call for more governmental experimentation.45 But the core
studies argue that government should conduct rigorous, randomized
policy experiments, and some work demonstrates, through real-world
examples, how governments can experiment and the insights such
experimentation can produce.46 Similarly, evidence-based policy - a
growing body of work that we place within this experimental design
category - strives to incorporate important attributes of policy
experimentation, such as controls and randomization, and to apply the
lessons of these experiments in a range of contexts, from criminal
procedure to health care and education policy.47
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
6-7 (2009) (arguing for a focus on how experimentation within federalism works);
Doni Gewirtzman, Complex Experimental Federalism, 63 BuFF. L. REv. 241, 245 (2015)
(focusing on the need to "identify the traits that allow decentralized systems to
innovate effectively" and the extent to which our governance system "contains those
traits").
45 See, e.g., Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory
Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111 (David Moss
& John Cisternino eds., 2009).
46 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 44; Abramowicz et al., supra note 1, at 987-1004.
47 See, e.g., JAMES A. RICCio, SUSTAINED EARNINGS GAINS FOR RESIDENTS IN A PUBLIC
HOUSING JOBS PROGRAM: SEVEN-YEAR FINDINGS FROM THE JOBS-PLUS DEMONSTRATION 3
n.3 (2010), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/policybrief_33.pdf [hereinafter
SUSTAINED EARNINGS GAINS] (explaining the use of control and treatment groups in the
Jobs-Plus program, which we describe in a case study below); Kathleen J. Sikkema,
HIV Prevention Among Women in Low-Income Housing Developments: Issues and
Intervention Outcomes in a Place-Based Randomized Controlled Trial, 599 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 52, 56-57 (2005) (describing policy trials involving "HIV
prevention community-level intervention projects, focused on men patronizing gay
bars in sixteen small U.S. cities" and a study that built from this to determine whether
"HIV prevention intervention would have a similar effect with different and more
disadvantaged populations," thus applying the program to "impoverished and
predominantly minority women who live in low-income, inner-city housing
developments"); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of
Principles of Evidence-Based Practices to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F.
L. REV. 585, 596 (2009) (describing "rigorous evaluations of various types of
corrections programs using non-treatment control groups well-matched to the
treatment group"); David Weisburd, Hot Spots Policing Experiments and Criminal
Justice Research: Lessons from the Field, 599 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 220,
221 (2005) (describing policy trials involving "[h]ot spots policing" - "the
concentration of police resources in small discrete areas"). In contrast, some initiatives
labeled as evidence-based policy merely require or encourage decisionmakers to
collect data and incorporate those data into policy. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Two
Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values in Education Policymaking and Beyond,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1933, 1940-44 (2017) (critiquing the Every Student Succeeds Act
of 2015, which requires only limited collection and implementation of data, and
describing the generous definitions of "evidence" used in the Act); Will Rhee,
Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33
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The second body of work considers "adaptive management."48 In
contrast to the experimental design literature, which focuses on
developing rigorous and discrete policy experiments, the adaptive
management literature makes a sweeping claim: all policy
interventions are experimental, and should be treated as such.49
Proponents of adaptive management argue that in a world of
uncertainty and limited knowledge, policy must and should evolve
through learning.50 That means treating policies as provisional
experiments, monitoring their results, and continuously adjusting
them.51
The adaptive management literature is enormous, and it explores a
wide range of sub-issues.52 But for our purposes, just two points about
both the adaptive management and experimental design literature are
particularly important. Each typically focuses on experiments
implemented by a single governing entity,53 and neither has much to
say about how its recommended governance approaches should be
integrated with a federalist system.54 In our view, this is not a failing.
PACE L. REV. 60, 86-95 (2013) (describing empirical studies of issues such as hung
juries and sealed settlements and the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's growing
reliance on empirical evidence).
48 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REv. 1, 3-4, 9-10 (2014).
49 E.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (1993) ("[Plolicies are experiments; learn from them.").
50 See Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 1339, 1339 (2011).
51 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing the Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 907-
08 (2003).
52 The literature critiquing adaptive management is also extensive. See, e.g., Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management, The Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional
Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Management, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 51-66
(2001) (describing "barriers" to adaptive management as well as the "fuzziness" of the
term); Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 265, 330-35 (2009) (offering a qualified critique of adaptive management while
conceding its value in some circumstances).
53 But see Welch & Thompson, supra note 28, at 717-28 (discussing federal
grants-in-aid and other incentives and the extent to which they cause state policy
innovation and diffusion). Some literature also discusses flexible governmental
approaches (not experimentation) through shared agency control at one governmental
level. Cf. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARv. L. REv. 1131, 1192 (2012) (arguing that agency coordination through
memoranda of understanding produces flexibility that "is advantageous because it
allows agencies to adapt to new circumstances over time without resorting to
elaborate and time-consuming procedures").
54 See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 48, at 63-87 (providing "The Model Adaptive
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The lack of attention to federalism simply reflects the authors' desire
to keep their examples simple and to explore principles that should
not be limited to any particular governance structure. But it does mean
that these bodies of literature address the intersections of federalism
and experimentalism only obliquely.
C. Democratic Experimentalism Theory
In contrast to the traditional federalism, experimental design, and
adaptive management literatures, one school of thought has
consciously built itself around the intersection of experimentalism and
federalist structures. In a series of articles, Charles Sabel, Michael
Dorf, and other academic authors have argued for "democratic
experimentalism," a system in which governance occurs through
continuous processes of goal setting, policy innovation, measurement,
reexamination, and adjustment.55 Federalism is central to this vision.
As Dorf and Sabel explain, "[tihe chief role of Congress in such a
system would be to authorize and finance experimental reform by
states and other subnational jurisdictions," and federal agencies would
help with benchmarking efforts and other aspects of the experiment.56
They are not alone in proposing this approach. Other advocates of
forms of experimental governance have articulated a similar vision, in
which the federalist system allows the national government o play a
facilitative role in state experimentation.57
Management Procedure Act," which envisions action by a single federal agency).
55 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288, 345 (1998); Charles Sabel & William H.
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L. J. 53,
55 (2011).
56 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 55, at 288, 345.
57 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 381 (2004)
(identifying experimental governance with devolution to state and local
governments); Livermore, supra note 8 (exploring "managed experimentation"); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 121-25 (2015)
(envisioning an experimental system with an international body at the coordinating
center and nations as the sites of experimentation); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at
615-16 (although remaining skeptical of prospects for effective experimentation,
noting that "a federal structure can encourage innovation by lower level governments"
if national politicians spearhead an "innovation policy," such as awarding "grants to
low-level governments on the condition that they carry out a search for new ways of
doing things," or issue federal prizes to lower-level governments to reward "new
ideas"); sources cited supra note 28 (introducing some of the sources that have
focused on the federal government as a facilitator and coordinator of experiments).
Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy observe that a federal facilitative role is not necessary in
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This is an intriguing concept, and in some ways, the ideas we
express in this Article are extensions of this school of thought. But
there are three key ways in which experimental governance scholars'
visions of experimental federalism differ from the vision we will
expound. First, as other commentators have pointed out, the
experimental governance literature often treats policy experimentation
as such a broad category that it removes much of the meaning from
the term.58 As Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal note, "[a]ny
situation in which actors 'try different things' is considered to be
experimental, without engagement with the well-developed
understandings of experimentation in the natural and social
sciences."5 9
Second, while the experimentalist governance literature embraces
federalism as a source of experimentation, its federalist vision is
narrowly cabined. Dorf and Sabel, for example, discuss intriguing
examples of innovative federal policy, 60 but in their proposed
governance model, "the state and local governments actually do the
experimenting."61 In contrast, the federal government, which they
describe as highly centralized, facilitates and does little else.62 In
reality, however, the federal government is itself decentralized in many
ways, some of which can enable differentiation and experimentation.63
Indeed, two of our case studies describe the federal government
initially carrying out much of the experimentation itself - relying on
agents in far-flung rural pockets of the country to test, demonstrate,
some scenarios, such as when state or local governments are "highly heterogeneous"
and will produce few positive externalities from which others would benefit. These
entities might simply independently innovate. Galle & Leahy, supra note 5, at 1361.
58 See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 55, at 78-92 (treating as examples of
experimentalism a wide variety of government programs, many of which do not
appear to have some of the key attributes featured in democratic experimentalists' own
definition of the term). Some of the experimentalist governance literature qualifies
this sweeping use of examples by noting that the programs described exemplify some
potential elements of an experimental governance regime. But in other places, those
qualifiers seem to disappear.
59 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44, at 2.
60 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 55, at 332-36, 382-88 (describing innovative
federal policies).
61 Id. at 428.
62 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 55, at 428.
63 See Owen, Regional Federal Administration, supra note 43, at 109-10; Richard
Briffault, What about the 'Ism'? Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (1994) (noting that federalism arguments
grounded in the virtues of decentralization would favor redistributing power from
states to local governments).
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and diffuse better agricultural conservation policy64 and fire
management65 practices. And contrary to the vision of states serving as
the decentralized entities that implement a federal experimental
vision, state governments can be relatively central, at least in
comparison to cities and other units of local government, and they too
can be the top-down initiators and organizers of lower-level
experiments.66 As our Race to the Top example discusses, the federal
government enlisted states to act as the organizers of a far more
decentralized experiment in education reform - one largely carried
out at the school district level.67
Finally, our governance systems also contain many actors that do
not fit neatly into the traditional hierarchy of federal, state, and local
governments typically described in the federalism and democratic
experimentalism literatures.68 Real-world federalism is thus messy and
complex, and that complexity demands more nuance in discussions of
the roles of different governing entities in an experimentalist system.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF EXPERIMENTALIST FEDERALISM
Scarce attention to the intersection of federalism and
experimentalism would not be a problem if, as the traditional
federalism literature seems to presuppose, state-centered
experimentation emerged naturally and frequently from a federalist
structure. But there are many reasons to think it does not. This Part
explains why purely state-centric federalism may not be such fertile
64 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
65 See infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
66 Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism 1-4 (UC Hastings College of Law,
Research Paper No. 258, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=3071907 [hereinafter Cooperative Subfederalism].
67 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: INNOVATION IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
UNDER RACE TO THE TOP xvi, 32 (2015), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/
racetothetop/rttfinalrptl 1 15.pdf [hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE] ("States are using
performance management approaches to help districts support effective interventions
in their lowest-performing schools. . . . States like Tennessee, North Carolina and
Massachusetts created networks of their lowest-performing schools that improved
supports for teachers and school and district leaders ... Ohio districts hired former
principals with track records of improving student achievement to coach principals in
struggling schools."); see DIST. REFORM SUPPORT NETWORK, TRANSFORMING THE CULTURE
OF TEACHING AND LEARNING: FOUR RACE TO THE TOP-DISTRICT GRANTEES'
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONALIZED LEARNING 4, https://rttd.grads360.org/services/
PDCService.svc/GetPDCDocumentFile?fileld=21503.
68 See, e.g., Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, supra note 66, at 10-12 (describing
air quality management districts and land use planning agencies with territories
encompassing multiple cities and counties).
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ground for experimentation and, therefore, why more careful
exploration of arrangements that can produce experimentation is
worthwhile.
A. Defining Policy Experiments
Before embarking on our critique of states as the assumed natural
leaders of policy experiments, we provide a few words about what we
mean by "experiment." In this Article, we use the term to refer to
processes that share, to at least some degree, several common
attributes. These processes need not mirror the sterile halls of a
scientific laboratory to count as an experiment, but they must exhibit
some attributes of the traditional definition of this term.
* First, a policy experiment should reflect one or more
hypotheses.69 An experiment, at its core, is a test of an
idea, and it is difficult to run a meaningful test without
first deciding on the idea(s) to test.
* Second, experimentation requires policy differentiation.
That differentiation might occur by design, as in a
controlled, randomized experiment, or researchers may
opportunistically exploit policy differences that arise
naturally.70 But in either case, the differentiation should
allow a comparison that will put the experimental
hypothesis to the test.71
* Third, experimentation requires control of confounding
variables. In a controlled experiment, experimenters can
randomize the distribution of subjects into groups with
different treatments, and they can control variables by
focusing differentiation on a single key attribute.72 For
natural experiments, such control is much more difficult. 73
69 See Michael J. Saks, Scientific Method: The Logic of Drawing Inferences from
Empirical Evidence, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY 305, 312 (David Faigman et al. eds., 2017).
70 See, e.g., Mark R. Rozenssweig & Kenneth I. Wolpin, Natural "Natural
Experiments" in Economics, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 827, 828 (2000).
71 See Saks, supra note 69, at 304 (explaining that an experiment should try to
falsify its hypothesis).
72 See Abramowicz et al., supra note 1, at 934-37 (explaining how randomization
works and the advantages it provides).
73 See id. at 939-43 (describing advantages of randomization relative to regression
analyses of natural experiments).
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Nevertheless, techniques like regression analysis can
sometimes allow for enough control of enough
confounding variables to facilitate qualified confidence in
experimental conclusions.7 4
* Fourth, experimentation requires observation and data
collection, and requires analysis of those observations and
data.75
* Fifth, experimentation requires documentation. In
academic settings, an experimental study often culminates
in a write-up that explains the study and its results and
analyzes its significance.76 Typically, that paper will be
peer-reviewed prior to publication.77 In non-academic
policy settings, peer review is less prevalent, though still
potentially valuable, and we will use the term
"experiment" to describe situations in which such review
is absent.78
* Sixth, effective policy experimentation will require both
repetition and adjustment of the experimental design. In
most fields, researchers are reluctant to draw firm
conclusions from individual experiments 7 They instead
74 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of
the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 373-88 (1997) (reviewing
CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED
SPECIES (1995)) (using statistical analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of various
policy strategies deployed under the Endangered Species Act, while controlling for
variables, to undercut claims that the Endangered Species Act is ineffective).
75 See Saks, supra note 69, at 307-10 (describing the importance of observation, as
well as the complex issues that can arise as experimenters decide what to measure and
observe).
76 One major problem with experimental research is that findings are more likely
to be published if they are interesting, and they are more likely to be interesting if they
are counterintuitive or surprising. That "publication bias" creates incentives for
researches to interpret their results in more interesting ways and means that a skewed
subset of results actually gets published. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 1, at 943
(describing this problem).
77 See Jerome P. Kassirer & Edward W. Campion, Peer Review: Crude and
Understudied, but Indispensable, 272 JAMA 96, 96 (1994) (describing and critiquing
peer review practices).
78 See J.B. Ruhl & Jim Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1, 15 (2006) ("The use of peer review is far more limited and variable by
agencies when exercising regulatory responsibilities.").
79 See Saks, supra note 69, at 305 (noting that researchers become confident that a
hypothesis is probably correct only after it has survived repeated attempts at
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try to reproduce experiments, both to test the validity of
the original results and to discern the sensitivity of results
to different interventions.80
One other point about our use of the term "experiment" bears
mention. While we do not use the term as broadly as many legal
authors,8' we also do not limit it to situations that would score very
highly on each of these metrics. It is usually quite difficult to manage
policy experimentation with laboratory-style rigor,82 and if the term
"experiment" is to have more than occasional relevance to policy
realms, it needs to include messier efforts. For that reason, we think
policy experimentation is best thought of as a continuum, not a single,
discrete category of action. A carefully designed, randomized
experiment, which commentators often describe as the "gold
standard," might reach the top of that continuum.83 But we also
extend the term to situations in which hypotheses exist but are
somewhat muddy, confounding variables are imperfectly controlled,
data collection happens but is uneven, and formal peer review does
not exist.84 These tin-standard experiments are sometimes the highest
level of experimentation that makes sense or the best we can hope for,
and we therefore include them in our discussion.85
falsification).
80 See Arturo Casadevall & Ferric C. Fang, Reproducible Science, 78 INFECTION &
IMMUNITY 4972, 4972 (2010) (describing reproducibility as "a bedrock principle in the
conduct and validation of experimental science").
81 To be fair, the pots are calling the kettle black. We both have used the term
"experiment" somewhat indiscriminately in our own past work.
82 Of course, achieving rigor is also difficult in laboratories. Even dedicated
scientists can fall victim to a variety of distorting effects, including confirmation and
publication biases.
83 See, e.g., D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual
Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2122 (2012). For arguments questioning whether
researchers overvalue randomization, see Angus Deaton & Nancy Cartwright,
Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Control Trials 2 (Nat'1 Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22595, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w22595.pdf.
84 Much of the literature on evidence-based policy and governmental innovation,
while open to more rigorous experimental approaches, encourages and recognizes the
value of these alternative approaches. See sources cited supra note 47.
85 See infra Part II.B (discussing reasons, some of them perfectly valid, why
governments might not want to experiment).
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B. Barriers to Combining Policy Experiments and Federalism
While we have defined "experiment" broadly, much of the governing
done within a federalist system will not fit even within that capacious
definition. There are several reasons why, and we discuss these
challenges within the definitional contours introduced in Part II.A.
1. Differentiation and Confounding Variables
Policy differentiation is the reason why a connection between
federalism and experimental governance seems obvious.86 Indeed, a
federalist system seems designed, above all else, to allow different
subnational jurisdictions to adopt differing policies.87 But there are
several reasons why the policy differentiation produced by federalism
may not produce as much experimentation as one might expect.
First, as other commentators have pointed out, states' incentives for
experimentation are often weaker than conventional federalism theory
presupposes.8 8 From a state or local perspective, the optimal policy
approach may be not to experiment, but instead to adopt new
approaches after some other jurisdiction has demonstrated that the
approach works and has sorted out its kinks.89 Imitation, after all, is
usually easier than invention.90 This means that there may be few to
no first-mover innovators due to the prospect of free riding and the
risk of losing votes when undertaking a new policy experiment. Or,
alternatively, state leaders may focus on conforming their policy
initiatives to the expectations of national political parties rather than
seeking to forge an independent course.91 There are countervailing
86 See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 957 (2016)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (drawing a connection between "state-law diversity" and
"the role of States as laboratories").
87 See Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1354-55
(2013) (noting this benefit of a federalist system); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1997) (reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) ("The first, and most
axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be adapted to
local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must take a uniform ...
approach.").
88 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 614-15 (arguing that federalism is not
nearly as likely to promote experimentation as its proponents suggest); Galle &
Leahy, supra note 5, at 1339 (largely agreeing with Rose-Ackerman's conclusions).
89 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 610-11.
90 See Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
703, 707-29 (2016) (documenting state's reluctance to differentiate state law from
federal even in realms where states have clear authority to chart their own courses).
91 See Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal
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incentives, of course. Leaders can make their names as policy
entrepreneurs,92 and sometimes a subnational political climate will
reward leaders for differentiating their jurisdiction from its neighbors
or from the national government.93 But the idea that federalism will
lead state and local governments inexorably toward policy
differentiation overstates the case.
Second, federalism may not produce the kinds of differentiation that
facilitate learning. True experiments require tailored levels of policy
differentiation. If a jurisdiction adopts a program that differs from
those of its neighbors in four or five key ways, for example, it can be
difficult to isolate the differences that actually matter.
Experimentalism also requires carefully timed differentiation, and
real-world differentiation may not last very long. For example, two
local governments might adopt different responses to the same policy
problem. If one jurisdiction's approach initially seems to work, the
other jurisdiction may change course before anyone has gathered
enough data to separate signal from noise.94 Or, alternatively, two
jurisdictions may adopt policies that seem to invite comparison, but
may do so at different times. A land use policy might succeed during a
booming economy while a slightly differentiated policy fails during a
recessionary period a few years later, and observers will have a hard
time determining whether it was the differentiation or the recession
that changed outcomes.
As that last example illustrates, differentiation problems are deeply
intertwined with a federalist system's tendency to produce
confounding variables. One of the reasons the federalism-
experimentalism connection seems intuitive is that subnational
governments can do different things. But that capacity for
Safeguards, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 977, 980 (2002) (arguing that the agendas of national
political parties dominate state policy selection).
92 See, e.g., Mintrom, supra note 4, at 739, 765 (arguing that state-level policy
entrepreneurs - "people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change" - "play an
important role in articulating innovative ideas onto government agendas").
93 See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions
Auctions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 88-91 (2013) (describing policy entrepreneurial
behavior in the creation of the northeast's Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative);
Hiroko Tabuchi, U.S. Climate Change Policy: Made in California, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/climate/california-climate-change.html.
94 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44, at 21 (noting the tendency of experimenters
to "bunch" around promising interventions, avoiding others that might in fact prove
successful"); Gary King et al., A "Politically Robust" Experimental Design for Public
Policy Evaluation, with Application to the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Program,
26 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 479, 479-80 (2007) (noting that it is often politically
infeasible to maintain a control group where a treatment seems to be succeeding).
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differentiation, even if sometimes overstated, has led to a history of
differentiation. That history - along with immutable differences of
geography and population - means that even adjacent state and local
governments tend to differ in many ways. A medical researcher
probably would not choose to work in a laboratory that houses fifty
different research animals, no two of which are the same; she would
want her lab rats as identical as possible.95 Yet the subnational
jurisdictions of the United States are more akin to the former
menagerie than the latter controlled environment. That means that
any experiment designed to compare policies in different jurisdictions
is likely to confront an abundance of confounding variables.
In one other key way, federalism creates problems with confounding
variables. According to most researchers, the best way to control for
such variables is through randomization.96 But randomization requires
a high level of control from the experimenter, who randomly assigns
subjects to different treatments.97 And a core purpose of federalism is
to limit this type of centralized control, and thus to protect the partial
sovereignty of state governments.98 The differentiation of federalism
happens because subnational governments choose it, not through
random assignment. Consequently, randomization, despite its
promise, will generally be antithetical to federalism.
2. Data Collection and Analysis
Meaningful experimentation requires data collection in addition to
controlled differentiation. Yet a federalist structure does not
necessarily incentivize states to produce or disseminate useful data.
There are several reasons why.
First, in any governance system, the sponsors of a policy may not
have much incentive to collect data.99 They will likely have adopted
95 Cf. FEELEY & RUBIN, FEDERALISM, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that in medical
research "it would be unusual for the researcher to authorize the subjects to follow
whatever course of treatment they desire" and observing that a centralized authority
would have to be involved in designing an experiment to avoid this type of result).
96 See Abramowicz et al., supra note 1, at 933 (arguing that randomization should
be used for more policy analyses).
97 This statement may sound paradoxical - one might ask how control can be the
key to randomness - but the alternative to control by the experiment's designer may
be experimental subjects sorting themselves into groups in non-random ways.
98 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (extolling the benefits of
divided government).
99 See generally Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1 (2011) (explaining reasons why monitoring is often absent or ineffective).
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that policy because they believe it will work and because they have
successfully convinced others that it will work. They therefore may
not perceive the need to collect data to validate what they think they
already know - or to potentially undercut their own prior claims.100
Or, somewhat similarly, the only data that interests them may be
information about the political marketability of their initiative, not its
actual success in achieving policy goals.101 Additionally, data
collection is often expensive.102 If overall program funds are limited,
every dollar devoted to data collection and analysis is not spent on
other aspects of program implementation. For managers who believe
- perhaps correctly - that the program is important and already
well-designed, and therefore expect that every dollar spent on
implementation will make their state or city a better place, that
opportunity cost may be intolerable.
These problems can arise when a single jurisdiction is conducting
an experiment, but they are likely to be even more acute when the
goal is to produce results that might benefit other jurisdictions within
a federalist system. The problem, again, is one of free riding: a
jurisdiction will usually want to gather data only to the extent that it
benefits from that data collection, not because it offers some potential
benefit to its neighbors.103 Or, it might even think that because its
neighbors will collect data on some policy experiment, it can skimp on
data collection and use the information others compile.
Even if jurisdictions within a federalist system are committed to data
collection, problems of comparability may arise. To compare multiple
jurisdictions, researchers generally need data that addresses uniform
metrics and were collected in consistent ways. Otherwise, any attempt
at comparative analysis risks mixing apples and oranges. But just as a
federalist system allows some policy differentiation, it also can
facilitate differentiation in more technical matters like data collection
practices and management platforms.104 That differentiation will not
100 See, e.g., THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 137 (1991) (quoting an EPA
analyst: "How is my career going to be advanced by doing a study that shows that
three years ago the agency made a wrong prediction? It is not in my best interest.").
101 See Livermore, supra note 8, at 639 (noting that politicians may pursue
experiments for reasons other than helping the public).
102 See Biber, supra note 99, at 31.
103 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1713-14
(2014) [hereinafter Regulatory Islands] (noting disincentives to gather and share
information).
104 See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS:
How EPA AND THE STATES CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
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necessarily occur; in software selection, as in policy development,
imitation can bring efficiencies. But real-world examples show that
problems with inconsistent data sets do often arise.105
3. Repetition and Variation
Beyond data limits, a federalist system also offers mixed prospects
for integrating individual experiments into a larger experimental
program. That potential does exist. The possibility of imitation may
facilitate re-testing of policy experiments, with the imitators either
using the same basic policy or using slightly adjusted approaches.
Indeed, a large literature argues that policy diffusion, including
diffusion within regions, is common.1 0 6 With regional diffusion, in
particular, neighboring states might have sufficiently similar
characteristics to produce a sort of re-test with each jump of the policy
across a state line.1o7 Such repetition can help experimenters figure out
whether a successful experiment is replicable and also how subtle
adjustments to the policy program affect its success.
Nevertheless, federalism can create .barriers to programmatic
experimentation. As one of us has previously explained, it can be
exceedingly difficult for states and local governments to obtain
information about what other jurisdictions' policies even are.108
Particularly in rapidly evolving policy realms - which are precisely
the areas where experimentation would theoretically be most valuable
- state policies may be dynamic and poorly documented. This makes
obtaining information about those policies a time-consuming exercise
with quickly-outdated results.109 To gather information about the
consequences of those policies will be even more difficult if such
INFORMATION 24 (2001) (describing state-to-state differences in data collection
practices).
105 See, e.g., id.
106 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage Versus Policy Diffusion: The Perils and
Promise of Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. INT'L L. 359, 375-76 (2013); Katerina
Linos, Note, When Do Policy Innovations Spread? Lessons for Advocates of Lesson-
Drawing, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1467, 1468-70 (2006); sources cited supra note 6
(describing some of the political science literature on diffusion).
107 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44, at 10 (describing how political boundaries
can facilitate comparisons); Berry & Berry, supra note 4, at 403 (noting "research that
has found that there are states to which the other states in a region look most
frequently for innovative ideas").
108 See Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, supra note 103, at 1699-702.
109 See, e.g., id. at 1694-704 (describing how hard it can be for states to obtain
information about other states' fracking policies).
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information even exists.110 And even when subnational jurisdictions
do obtain information about their peers' initiatives, they are likely to
access that information through intermediaries, and those
intermediaries may have powerful motives to slant the information
they provide."' Consequently, in the political real world, policy
propagation is likely to be haphazard and uninformed. And the
ideological narratives surrounding a policy may drive the spread of
policies more effectively than any empirical measures of their success.
C. Federalism, Experimentation, and Centralized Authority
To all the problems described above, there is an obvious response.
These many design problems can be ameliorated if there is a
centralized manager coordinating the experiments. Federalism offers
the possibility of such management. While the political and,
sometimes, judicial and academic rhetoric of federalism often fixates
solely on state empowerment, a strong, if also limited, centralized
government is an essential element of the United States' federalist
system.1l2 That centralized government could play the part of
manager. Indeed, this is close to the democratic experimentalism
scholars' vision: in their proposed system, federal coordination helps
state and local experimental governance succeed.113 And in state-local
relationships, the states could play that same centralized coordinating
role.114
At a basic level, we agree with that prescription. But identifying at a
general level the possibility of centralized coordination is only a start,
and the federal government can do much more than just coordinate.
For that reason, the next Part turns to explaining a typology that
captures ways in which federal coordination of experimental systems
actually has been done, along with other experimental approaches that
fall near or far from the federalized model.
110 See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text (describing disincentives to
gather and share monitoring data).
ii1 See Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, supra note 103, at 1715-16 (noting
disincentives to gather and share information).
112 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the federal government's importance); Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1456-58 (1987) (discussing the many
constitutional provisions that emphasize the supremacy of the national government).
113 See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
114 See Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, supra note 66, at 3-5.
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III. MODELS OF POLICY EXPERIMENTATION
Once one moves beyond the assumption that sub-federal control
organically fosters experimentation, there are several ways to
categorize the many types of experimentation that do occur and the
many governance levels that serve as their locus. We define two major
axes as the foundation of an analytical framework. The first is the
degree of federal involvement in the experiment or, conversely, state
or local leadership. The second is the extent to which the experiment
incorporates the experimental features identified in Part II. After
describing these two primary features, we use case studies to
demonstrate experiments that fall at various points within this
framework.
The case studies, which come from agricultural, natural resources,
education, and welfare policy, illustrate two overarching points. First,
contrary to the suppositions of traditional federalism theories, the
federal government can be the engine of experimentation.
Democracy's laboratories need not be exclusively state or local, and
federalism theory ought to embrace that possibility. Second,
experimental federal policymaking can take place through a rich
variety of governance structures and with varying degrees of
experimental rigor. We make no claims that federal experimentation
always will be best, or about which of these structures is best or what
degree of experimental rigor is optimal. The answers to those
questions will likely be highly contextual, and they will depend on the
law governing a policy initiative, the nature of the resources or
practices being regulated, the relative competence of different agencies
and the resources available to them, and, of course, history and
politics. The answers also will change as conditions and policies
evolve. But we do claim, and our examples illustrate, that federal
experimentation is a promising alternative to a traditional and myopic
focus on the states.
A. A Typology of Policy Experiments
There are potentially endless ways to approach policy
experimentation. In some circumstances, a disheveled patchwork of
uncoordinated states independently throws solutions at problems and
sees how they stick.115 Through happenstance, this type of haphazard
115 This type of experiment has evolved in the context of regulating the
environmental impacts of oil and gas development. See generally Wiseman, Regulatory
Islands, supra note 103 (describing varied state policies that lack a common goal or
approach and that seem unmoored from any sort of broader experimental approach);
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effort might produce differing results and potential lessons, but it only
remotely resembles an experiment. At the other extreme, the federal
government sometimes carefully defines a goal and enlists states and
local governments to propose a variety of policy approaches to
meeting this goal. The federal government - often through a grant
mechanism - selects the states to implement these approaches,
requires detailed and uniform data reporting, and prepares reports on
the results achieved and their transferability.116 Alternatively, the
federal government may act alone.17 We characterize these extremes,
and the many gray areas in between, in two primary ways. We note,
first, that policy experiments differ in terms of which levels of
government design and implement them (the federalism aspect of
policy experimentation). Second, experiments differ in the extent to
which they incorporate key features, such as differentiation and
control of confounding variables (the design aspect of policy
experimentation). The framework does not capture every important
variable, of course. The balance of congressional and agency
involvement is another potential way of differentiating federal
experimental programs,"8 as is the degree to which participation in
the experimental program is mandatory or voluntary."9 But the degree
Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729
(2014) [hereinafter Risk and Response] (describing substantial variation in state oil and
gas policy).
116 See infra notes 268-91 and accompanying text (describing the Race to the Top
program).
117 See infra notes 234-69 and accompanying text (describing federal experiments
with wildfire).
118 Our examples primarily describe agency experimentation, but Congress funded
the Soil Experiment Stations described in Part Ill.B.1 below.
119 Voluntary or informal governance, in which actors exercise influence through
ongoing relations, norms, non-contractual mechanisms, and other modes of influence
beyond direct mandates or agreements is recognized in a variety of other contexts,
including internationally. and domestically within particular legal fields like contracts,
but not extensively in the federalism context. See generally INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas Christiansen & Christine Neuhold eds., 2012);
AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE
(2004). Our examples of experimentation primarily involve voluntary programs,
although some involve so much funding that they fall more toward the mandatory
side of the spectrum, in that farmers likely would not participate absent the huge
infusion of cash offered to them. See, e.g., NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
ILLINOIS RIVER SUB-BASIN AND EUCHA-SPAVINAW LAKE WATERSHED INITIATIVE PAYMENT
RATES (2014), https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PA NRCSConsumption/download?cid=
stelprdbl246424&ext=pdf (showing payment rates of more than $19,000 per acre for
certain soil conservation practices). Experimentation with mandatory policies can be
more difficult. Abramowicz et al. provide a helpful analysis of the potential ethical and
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of experimental rigor and the balance of federal and state involvement
are particularly important distinguishing criteria.
Figure 1 visually depicts this framework.120 The letters A through I
represent nine approaches to policy experimentation that could fall
under this framework.121




Much of the traditional federalism rhetoric - especially that
espoused by courts - hints, though without much elaboration, at
Boxes B and C.122 The courts seem to assume that a hands-off federal
legal issues of this type of experimentation, such as ensuring that experimentation
does not take away liberties already enjoyed by individuals (a difficult-to-meet
standard due to the challenges associated with properly defining the regulatory
"baseline"). They also explore the most analogous legal cases, which have upheld
lotteries in which only some individuals obtain the benefits of a policy of limited
availability. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 1, at 963-73.
120 By "minimal experimental rigor" we refer to policies that are implemented
without efforts to incorporate the design features that we identify in Part II as part of a
true policy experiment. Experiments with moderate rigor are implemented with some
effort at deliberate differentiation and typically include strong data gathering and
evaluation of program results, whereas truly rigorous experimentation would
incorporate nearly all of the design features identified and would use actual
randomized policy experiments or something close to that.
121 The rigid boundaries of a simplified matrix are not the real world, of course.
Many policy experiments likely fall along the borders of these boxes, and
policymakers face a continuum of design and governance choices rather than a
discrete set of options.
122 See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
Minimal Moderate Rigorous
Minimal federal A B C
involvement
Federal and state D E F
involvement
Minimal state G H I
involvement
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approach - for example, avoiding federal preemption of state policy
in a particular area - will cause states to take the experimental reins,
applying different types of policies and measuring and honestly
reporting the achievements or failures associated with these policies. 2 3
Experimental rigor has never been a focus of judicial discussion, and
thus it is hard to discern whether judges envision action in Box B or C
- or have even considered the distinction. But the emphasis on state
action is clear.
In contrast to the courts and many federalism scholars, the
experimental design literature pays attention to experimental rigor. It
thus focuses on boxes C, F, and I. But unlike the federalism camps, it
often ignores the levels of government at which the experiment plays
out.124 It therefore does not distinguish among boxes C, F, and I,
instead melding them and focusing generally on the degree to which a
real policy experiment emerges.
In the real world, most of the action is in box D. It is rare for the
federal government to truly stay out of the way of states, even where
there is no formal federal preemption of state control.125 Indeed, even
in fields lauded for longstanding state independence, such as land use
regulation and education, the federal government commonly induces
state and local action through grants and other spending mechanisms
and may intervene through regulatory controls.126 And governments
often embark upon these projects without an intentional policy
experiment in mind - thus failing to produce an even moderately
rigorous experiment - but some policy differentiation does emerge
along the way. Sometimes the federal government also intervenes to
support consistent data collection and dissemination practices, thus
edging state-directed projects closer to the D-E boundary.127
123 See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 170 (2009).
124 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
125 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1932 (2014) (arguing
that integration is the dominant theme of modern American federalism).
126 See Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense
of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 260-66 (2014) [hereinafter Agency
Enforcement] (describing federal grants in these and other areas). Many federal
regulatory interventions into education occur through civil rights laws, and many
interventions into land use occur through environmental laws.
127 See, e.g., FACT SHEET: Data by the People, for the People - Eight Years of
Progress Opening Government Data to Spur Innovation, Opportunity, & Economic
Growth, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/28/fact-sheet-data-
people-people-eight-years-progress-opening-government (describing multiple data
consistency and transparency initiatives).
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Meanwhile, real-world practices do sometimes fall within Box A, with
neither experimental rigor nor meaningful federal involvement.128
Missing from the traditional literature is any significant discussion
that explores the marriages of federalism and experimentation within
boxes E, F, H, and I. Yet those boxes are not null sets, as shown by the
case studies in Part II. The federal government can design and
implement experiments without much state or local assistance and
sometimes has done so. 129 It also has played a coordinating and
cooperating role in experimental programs partially staffed by local
governments and states.130
The following case studies - borrowed from the somewhat
disparate fields of agricultural, natural resources, education, and
welfare policy - are centrally designed to support our first and
primary point, from which further analysis will (we hope) flow. They
show that real-world policy experiments, both old and new, have
involved the federal government in instigating, implementing, and
coordinating experiments. The agricultural example occupies the bulk
of our discussion because it best exemplifies the degree and extent to
which the federal government can be centrally involved in
implementing and designing policy experiments. Our shorter forestry,
education, and welfare case studies further highlight some points
made in the agricultural context while in other ways providing
contrasting examples. There are, of course, numerous other examples
of experimentation - including federal involvement in
experimentation - from these and other fields,131 which could merit
exploration in further work. But these case studies, we believe, provide
a solid foundation for applying the framework we crafted in Part II.A,
for they highlight the many governance levels involved in single policy
experiments and varying degrees of rigor in experimentation.
Skeptics might argue that our agricultural and forestry case studies
are simply unusual subject areas - ones that have more to do with
uncontroversial physical science than with policy, and where federal
experimenting therefore would come abnormally easily. These
skeptics might nod to the Department of Education and Jobs-Plus
128 For example, as one of us has discussed in the energy law context, the federal
government has steered clear of certain aspects of oil and gas regulation, leaving
significant regulatory decisions to the states. The states, in turn, have implemented a
patchwork of regulatory approaches that have little semblance of an experiment. See
generally Wiseman, Risk and Response, supra note 115.
129 See, e.g., infra notes 231-66 and accompanying text (discussing wildfire policy).
130 See, e.g., infra notes 265-88 and accompanying text (discussing Race to the Top).
131 See sources cited supra note 47.
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examples as true "policy" experiments because they involve testing of
social policy and are truly "human centric"; they do not involve a
physical medium, like soil or trees, that falls more traditionally within
the realm of scientific research. But characterizing only these latter
examples as true policy experimentation would be wrong. The case
studies below show several areas in which physical science and policy
happen to be closely linked, but this does not detract from their
qualities as policy experiments. In our agricultural example, the
ultimate goals were not only to teach farmers how to keep soil on their
property. Instead, the goals also included experimenting with various
methods for ensuring maximum farmer buy-in (which was more of a
political experiment132) and informing legal decisions on the criteria
for allocating massive sums of federal money.133 Policy, in other
words, was centrally at issue.
Additionally, this sort of linkage between science and policy is
hardly atypical. In fields as diverse as education and health policy,
134
financial regulation,135 and endangered species protection,136 policy
decisions grounded in technical research, and often in science, are
routine, and pure policy decisions are rather hard to find. Even when
experiments use human subjects, and thus might be viewed more as
policy-oriented than, say, efforts to choose ideal wildfire policy, they
still have a "scientific" or technical bent. Indeed, in proposing truly
randomized policy experimentation, Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres,
and Yair Listokin point to policy experiments that some might argue
are difficult to separate from technical economic research - for
example, varying policy with respect to short sales of stock and
measuring impacts on stock liquidity.1 37 In short, a sharp distinction
132 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
133 See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Center for Education Policy Research, HARV. U., https://cepr.harvard.edu/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2017) (describing research initiatives). The idea of relying on
empirical research to inform important education policy decisions is not new. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (turning to education research to
support the Court's finding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal).
135 See, e.g., About the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/dera/about (last visited Nov. 14, 2017); Economic
Research, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. REs. Sys., https://www.federalreserve.gov/
econres.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2017) (providing links to policy-relevant economic
research and describing the Fed's research support efforts).
136 See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species
Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 399 (2004) (noting the
importance of science to endangered species policy).
137 See Abramowicz et al., supra note 1, at 989.
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between technical and policy experimentation does not apply to the
case studies here - or to the rest of policymaking.
B. Agricultural Soil Conservation: A Rigorous Experiment with
Extensive Federal Involvement
One might think that no policy arena is less likely to produce a
program of federal experimentation than the management of private
agricultural land.138 After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized the states' "traditional and primary power over land and
water use," and has likewise asserted that "regulation of land use is
perhaps the quintessential state activity." 139 Both in judicial
proceedings and in the political realm, that rhetoric has real bite. The
Court has invoked it as a reason for questioning assertions of federal
regulatory jurisdiction.140 Agricultural interests and their elected
supporters have aggressively deployed federalist arguments in their
opposition to anything that verges on land use regulation.141 Yet a
rigorous, long-lasting, and far-reaching set of policy experiments
resides in the area of agricultural policy. Specifically, federal policy
was designed to reduce the loss of valuable agricultural topsoil
through erosion on millions of acres of private farmland and to
persuade farmers to implement this policy on millions of individual
farms and ranches.142 These experiments began in the 1920s, grew in
138 Indeed, when President Roosevelt first devoted some Civilian Conservation
Corps funds to controlling soil erosion on private lands this was a controversial move
due to "[c]oncern about the public's objections to expenditures of federal funds on
private lands." Helms, The Civilian Conservation, supra note 15, at 184.
139 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001);
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982). The
latter statement is inaccurate; most land use regulation is done by local governments.
140 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (warning that
extending federal authority to "immense stretches of intrastate land . . . stretches the
outer limits of Congress's commerce power and raises difficult questions about the
ultimate scope of that power"); Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174; Fed. Power
Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (noting states' utility policies).
For a thorough exploration of courts' use of the laboratories argument both to justify
experimentation by state courts and state policymakers, see Althouse, supra note 3, at
1752-75.
141 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape,
82 U. COLO. L. REv. 431, 477 & nn.288-89 (2011) (compiling quotes from legislative
hearings).
142 Much of this policy is "voluntary" because it involves using money,
demonstration projects, and direct provision of supplies such as seeds and other
erosion control devices to farmers to incentivize them to improve soil conservation
practices, but it is nonetheless policy. And not all measures are voluntary. Farmers
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scope as the Dust Bowl turned soil erosion into a national tragedy, and
have continued to the present day.
The discussion that follows describes these experiments. It supports
two key points, both of which defy core federalism assumptions. First,
this program, though integrated with the state and local structures of
traditional federalism, was truly federal at its core. The program first
developed through direct contact between federal agency employees
and private landowners, and state involvement, when it did take place,
occurred within a policy framework established by federal agencies.
Second, the program was genuinely experimental. Federal scientists
took contrasting theories and generated alternative hypotheses, tested
those hypotheses through carefully controlled experiments, recorded
and publicized results, and then folded those results back into new
experiments and policy change.
1. Federal Agencies and Private Dirt
The federal government was concerned about the loss of soil
through erosion well before the notorious dust storms of the 1930s. As
early as 1917, the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
sent an agricultural engineer to study methods of preventing soil loss
in the southeastern United States.143 After visiting farms throughout
five states, this engineer found one farm, in particular, that seemed to
produce promising results, and he suggested that the techniques
deployed on this farm be applied with needed modifications,
elsewhere.1 4 But as historians tell it, the USDA's true experiments in
agricultural policy began in 1928, when Hugh Hammond Bennett, a
visionary soil surveyor employed by the federal Bureau of Chemistry
and Soils (a division of the USDA), collaborated with a Forest Service
inspector to write a USDA report called "Soil Erosion, A National
Menace."145 This document alerted the public, as well as congressmen
who do not implement USDA conservation practices are ineligible for a variety of
federal funds. See, e.g., Environmental Quality Incentives Program, USDA NAT.
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/
national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (describing farmers
selected for funding based specifically on the conservation practices they implement).
143 See G. E. MARTIN, TERRACING IN OKLAHOMA 6-7 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Circular
No. 218, 1930).
144 See id.
145 H.H. BENNETT & W.R. CHAPLINE, SOIL EROSION A NATIONAL MENACE (U.S. Dep't
of Agric., Circular No. 33, 1928); see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL PART I: SOIL,
WATER, AND RELATED RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES STATUS, CONDITION, AND TRENDS
9 (1981) [hereinafter 1980 APPRAISAL]; Helms, Two Centuries, supra note 15, at 25.
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and federal agencies, to the problem of soil loss caused by improperly
tilled and managed soils that blew or washed away.146 The authors
estimated that 1.5 billion tons of soil147 and at least 126 billion
"pounds of plant-food material" were lost annually.148 The federal
report was distinctly local in nature, drawing from examples around
the United States, documenting and providing pictures of problems in
specific regions, such as southwestern Wisconsin,149 and even counties
and individual farms, such as "an apple orchard near Lookout
Mountain in northeastern Kansas,"50 and "one place a few miles south
of Troy, Kans."151 The authors starkly concluded that "[an era of land
wreckage destined to weigh heavily upon the welfare of the next
generation is at hand."152
Sadly, they were right. During the 1930s, a combination of drought,
wind, and ill-advised policies (many of them federal'53) that had
encouraged cultivation of semi-arid lands devastated much of the
Great Plains. Year after year, rains failed, and without the natural sod
that had once held soils in place, winds took the topsoil aloft. A single
1934 storm sucked up 350 million tons of soil.154 As historian Donald
Worster has written:
The story of the southern plains in the 1930s is essentially
about dust storms, when the earth ran amok. And not once or
twice, but over and over for the better part of a decade: day
after day, year after year, of sand rattling against the window,
146 The report focused on water erosion but noted in footnote 1 that "Im]uch
damage is also done by wind erosion." BENNETT & CHAPLINE, supra note 145, at 1 n.1.
147 Id. at 5. This number comes from the estimate of "a yearly discharge of
500,000,000 tons of suspended material into the sea by rivers, plus twice this amount
stranded upon lower slopes and deposited" elsewhere on land or in inland waters. Id.
at 4. See also U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 9 (describing
this estimate).
148 BENNETT & CHAPLINE, supra note 145, at 2.
149 See id. at 11.
150 Id. at 10.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 22.
153 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 7-9 (describing the
acts that encouraged farmers who had recently emigrated from Europe and were
unfamiliar with U.S. landscapes, or how to properly till them, to acquire property at
low or even no cost).
154 See DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOwL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930s 13
(1979).
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of fine powder caking one's lips, of springtime turned to
despair, of poverty eating into self-confidence.155
While real-life Tom Joads fled west, and while John Steinbeck and
other writers penned their laments,156 federal soil scientists began to
respond. That response would not be easy, for when federal
experimentation in soil conservation policy began in earnest, there
were "more than 6.5 million farms on about one billion [privately-
owned] acres" scattered around the United States.157 Such a dispersed
and localized problem also might seem rather ill-suited for a federal
response. Nevertheless, a broad federal program emerged. The
program had two goals: to identify the best soil conservation practices,
and to determine the best ways to persuade millions of farmers to
adopt the practices.
The USDA began its implementation efforts by funding and
establishing "soil experiment stations," which it deployed around the
United States.158 At these stations, federal and state agents planted
experimental crops designed to trap soil particles and prevent them
from washing away, demonstrated modern plowing and growing
techniques that prevented erosion, and implemented other practices to
ascertain their effectiveness in the particular region and persuade
nearby farmers of their value.159 Early on in the effort, employees of
the Civilian Conservation Corps also directly implemented
conservation measures at these experiment stations and on public and
private lands, such as helping to plant crops and trees to hold soil.1 60
Congress and the executive branch created new administrative
structures to advance the soil management program. First, in 1933,
155 Id.
156 See generally JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939).
157 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 9 (providing statistics
from the 1930s). As of 1980, there were approximately "1.5 billion acres of
nonfederally owned" U.S. land, twenty-seven percent of which was devoted to
rangeland for livestock, an equal percentage of which was crop land, and nine percent
of which was pasture. Id. at 2.
158 See DOUGLAS HELMS, HUGH HAMMOND BENNETT AND THE CREATION OF THE SOIL
EROSION SERVICE 2 (2008), https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_.DOCUMENTS/
nrcsl43_021210.pdf [hereinafter CREATION]. These were later renamed soil
conservation experiment stations. Id.
159 See Helms, Two Centuries, supra note 15, at 26 ("In the new Soil Erosion
Service, Bennett located soil conservation projects in the watersheds near erosion
experiment stations so that the directors of the stations could utilize the research
information."); Bennett, Conservation Work, supra note 15, at 10-11 (noting "120
field stations scattered throughout the country" in 1940).
160 See Bennett, Conservation Work, supra note 15, at 14-15.
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Congress funded and created a new agency within the Department of
the Interior called the Soil Erosion Service, with Bennett at its head.161
The enactment of the Soil Conservation Act of 1935 quickly followed,
which renamed Bennett's new agency as the "Soil Conservation
Service" and moved it to the USDA. The goal of the service was to
"provide permanently for the control and prevention of soil
erosion." 62 Diverse research, demonstration, and other projects would
accomplish these objectives. Specifically, the act directed the Secretary
of Agriculture to "conduct surveys, investigations, and research
relating to the character of soil erosion and the preventive measures
needed;" to "publish" and "disseminate" the results of these surveys;
to "conduct demonstrational projects in areas subject to erosion by
wind or water;" and "[t]o carry out preventive measures, including,
but not limited to, engineering operations, methods of cultivation, the
growing of vegetation, and changes in use of land," among other
measures.163 Those ambitious tasks would be accomplished in part
through the network of soil experiment stations that the USDA had
already begun to build.
While the federal government led key parts of the effort, it did not
act entirely alone. The states, through federally-supported university
extension services,164 state forestry boards,165 and other divisions of
state government had already begun to study erosion problems and
experiment with solutions. Indeed, as early as 1887 the federal
government had donated lands to states (creating "land grant" colleges
and universities166) and funded state agricultural experiment stations,
"having due regard to the varying conditions and needs of the
respective States or Territories."1 67 Based on work at these experiment
161 See HELMS, CREATION, supra note 158, at 11-12. In 1935, Congress established the
Soil Conservation Service ("SCS") within the USDA, and thus the SES became SCS. Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1935, ch. 85, § 5, 49 Stat. 163, 164.
162 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act § 1; see also Douglas Helms,
SCS: 50 Years Young, FARMER, Mar. 16, 1985, at 48, 48 [hereinafter SCSI.
163 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act §1.
164 See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 143 (This source is a publication by the Oklahoma
Agricultural and Mechanical College and United States Department of Agriculture,
Cooperating, and the Extension Service County Agent in Stillwater, Oklahoma).
165 See, e.g., CAL. STATE BD. OF FORESTRY, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON SENATE
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION No. 27 (LEGISLATURE OF 1921), at 4 (1923).
166 A land grant university is a university built on land donated by the federal
government to a state. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & NAT'L INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC., NIFA
LAND-GRANT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (2014), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/resource/1gu-map-6_25_2014.pdf.
167 Hatch Act of 1887, ch. 314, §§ 1-2, 24 Stat. 440, 440-41.
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stations and elsewhere, states had issued reports about erosion and its
causes, and some had formed their own agricultural experiment
stations at which government officials implemented and assessed the
effectiveness of various farming and ranching practices. Bennett's 1928
report on the national soil erosion crisis cited examples from these
state experiment stations. For example, it contrasted two approaches
at the "Spur substation of the Texas Agricultural Experiment
Station,"168 and also drew upon reports from similar experiment
stations in Missouri and North Carolina.169 Another key portion of the
1935 Soil Conservation Act set the stage for the federal government to
directly collaborate with the states in experimenting and disseminating
results,170 in part because the federal government recognized that
securing effort and commitments from individual farmers would be
easier with state and local support.71
The effort to involve state and local governments in soil
conservation practices demonstrated a key focus of the policy
experiment - determining how to persuade farmers to adopt soil
conservation practices on their individual properties. While Hugh
Hammond Bennett pushed for soil experiment stations and federal
provision of materials and labor to individual farmers, the Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture championed more federal collaboration with
state and local government units, so that farmers would feel that they
had a more direct stake in the project.72
The federal government solidified the involvement of state and local
actors in the soil conservation experiment by providing a model act
through which states would enable the creation of local soil
16s See BENNET & CHAPLINE, supra note 145, at 6.
169 See id.
170 See Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1935, ch. 83, § 1(3), 49
Stat. 163, 163 (allowing the USDA to "cooperate or enter into agreements with, or to
furnish financial or other aid to, any agency, governmental or otherwise, or any
person . .. for the purposes of this Act").
171 As one source explains, "Widespread local leadership was required to motivate
and guide" the thousands of private landowners operating farms and ranches. U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL PART 1: SOIL, WATER, AND RELATED RESOURCES IN THE
UNITED STATES: STATUS, CONDITION, AND TRENDS 14 (1981); see also Douglas Helms,
Soil and Soil Conservation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN CULTURE 361, 362 (Charles
Reagan Wilson & William Ferris eds., 1989).
172 See Helms, Two Centuries, supra note 15, at 26 (describing M.L. Wilson's push
for soil conservation districts and arguing that Wilson believed that the soil
conservation districts would allow conservation practices to "spread nationwide,"
even after the CCC no longer operated, and that farmers who were part of
conservation districts "would be more interested and involved in planning and
carrying out of the work").
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conservation districts.173 This model law, adopted by all states in some
form,174 provided for federal involvement in these districts and
enabled close collaboration between the districts and the federal
government.75 Conservation districts continue to operate and exercise
173 Under the model act, each state formed a soil conservation district as a
"governmental subdivision" of the state. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. SOIL CONSERVATION
SERV., A STANDARD STATE SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICTS LAw 3 (1936) thereinafter
STANDARD CONSERVATION LAw]. The act provided that the state should first establish a
soil conservation committee of which a federal USDA representative could also serve
as a member. See id. at 5. Soil conservation districts could then be formed when "[a]ny
twenty-five" individuals occupying land within the area proposed to be a district
petitioned the committee requesting district formation. Id. at 7. The committee next
held a hearing to determine the need for the district and convened a referendum for
the formation of the district, in which all "occupiers of land" within the proposed
district boundaries could vote. Id. at 7-9. After a favorable vote and a determination by
the committee that the district could be feasibly administered, the committee
appointed two supervisors of the district, and three additional supervisors were
elected, thus creating a five-supervisor governing body of the district. Id. at 10, 15.
174 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 14.
175 These districts - the distinctly local bodies that became important players in
implementing diverse federal soil conservation efforts - had extensive powers under
the model act, which mirrored the powers granted to the USDA under the federal Soil
Conservation Act. They included, for example, conducting "surveys, investigations,
and research" relating to soil erosion and its prevention and disseminating the results
(but avoiding duplicative research by requiring district coordination with the state or
USDA); conducting "demonstrational projects within the district"; directly carrying
out erosion prevention and control measures; and obtaining and taking over U.S. and
state soil erosion control and conservation projects within its district or acting as an
agent of the United States in carrying out these projects, among other powers. U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., STANDARD CONSERVATION LAw, supra note 173, at 15-17. For a
description of the local, grassroots nature of these districts and their connection to
national goals, see Hearing on S. 2549, 73d Cong. 3 (1933) (statement of Hugh
Hammond Bennett) (transcript available in Iowa State University Special Collections
and University Archives Dept.) (explaining that the districts "are essentially large
groups of farmers and ranchers working together in neighborly fashion and helping
one another under a formalized type of organization" and observing that the districts
have "been effectively utilized in advancing the national program of soil
conservation"). For a description of federal involvement in these districts, see, e.g.,
Hugh Hammond Bennett, Chief, Soil Conservation Serv., Address Before the National
Association of County Agricultural Agents: The Cooperative Approach to Land
Problems 2 (Dec. 6, 1939) (transcript available at Iowa State University Special
Collections and University Archives Dept.) (noting that "most of the districts so far
organized have already called on both the Extension Service and the Soil Conservation
Service for help"); Bennett, Conservation Work, supra note 15, at 9 (noting in 1940
that the federal "Soil Conservation Service ... has adopted a definite policy of helping
the districts wherever possible, and right now, we are cooperating with 263 districts
comprising 159 million acres in 30 States," including assistance with surveys and
conservation projects).
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these powers. Three thousand districts176 now emphasize three soil
conservation strategies177 initially championed by Hugh Hammond
Bennett, applying and differentiating these practices across "nearly all
private rural land" in the United States.178
In addition to this reliance on state and local structures, the new
federal program continues to take advantage of its own geographic
decentralization. The Natural Resources Conservation Service
("NRCS") - the same agency originally headed by Bennett79 - has
built from the original strategies emphasized by Bennett and has
developed more formal, detailed federal standards for soil conservation
(and other conservation practices).8 But these are not uniform
standards. The NRCS has field offices in all fifty states18' and operates
local service centers,182 and these offices tailor federal conservation
standards to local conditions.183 Farmers who meet the local
conservation standards receive federal funding for implementing soil
conservation practices.184
176 About NACD, NAT'L Ass'N CONSERVATION DISTRICTS, http://www.nacdnet.org/
about-nacd/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
177 Soil, NAT'L Ass'N CONSERVATION DISTRICTS, http://www.nacdnet.org/about-
nacd/what-we-do/soil/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (noting that the districts focus on
"crop rotation, cover crops and no- or minimum tillage systems").
178 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 Appraisal, supra note 145, at 14.
179 The agency's name changed from the Soil Erosion Service to the Soil
Conservation Service and then to its current name of Natural Resources Conservation
Service. History of NRCS, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/about/history/ (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018).
180 See Conservation Practices, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailfullinational/technical/cp/ncps/?cid=
nrcsl43_026849 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
181 See State Offices Directory, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/contact/states/ (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) (showing that employees of the field offices have "USDA.gov" e-mail
addresses).
182 Id.
183 Each conservation standard is accompanied by a technical guide describing how
to implement federal conservation practices, and the guides "used in each field office
are localized so that they apply specifically to the geographic area for which they are
prepared." Conservation Practices, supra note 180.
184 See National Conservation Practice Standards, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION
SERV., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/technical/cp/ncps/ (last
visited Sept. 10, 2018) (showing that farmers must follow state, not national, conservation
practice standards). Farmers wishing to receive EQIP funds must prepare and have
approved a Conservation Activity Plan, which is "developed for producers to identify
conservation practices needed to address a specific natural resource need." FY 2016 EQIP
Conservation Activity Plan (CAP), USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
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Federal soil conservation policy also utilizes another national
program called the Cooperative Extension Service, which has been
active since 1914.185 Through this service, the federal government
provides funding and partners with state and local institutions - most
typically land grant universities but also other entities - to form
educational "extensions" around the country.186 These extensions,
through federal-state partnerships, conduct localized research and
then disseminate it in order to encourage farmers to adopt practices
with demonstrated beneficial results.187 Land-grant universities in each
state house primary state extension offices staffed with USDA
employees, and each state also has a "network of local or regional
offices."188 The Extension Service has "an office in or near most of the
nation's approximately 3,000 counties."189
In summary, the U.S. soil conservation program and broader federal
efforts to improve agriculture were both integrally tied to federalism
and predominantly federal. Although USDA policy experimentation
relies heavily on sub-federal involvement, the federal government has
played a major role throughout the long history of soil conservation
efforts. Indeed, many of the federal initiatives described above coexist
with highly localized government offices, including county offices.190
And the program's reach is striking. The data from just the first year of
the Civilian Conservation Corps' work shows the intensely local,
diffuse scale of this national effort, with the Corps improving more
than "950,000 acres of forest stands," which help to prevent erosion,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailnational/programs/financial/eqip/?cid=nrc
seprd401472 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018). As noted above, the USDA defines national
conservation practices that are then localized through field specific manuals. Conservation
Practices, supra note 180 (noting to farmers that "[ylou must have the conservation
practice standard developed by the state in which you are working to insure that you meet
all state and local criteria, which may be more restrictive than national criteria").
185 Cooperative Extension History, USDA NAT'L INST. FOOD & AGRIC.,
https://nifa.usda.gov/cooperative-extension-history (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
186 See NAT'L INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUSTAINING THE NATION'S
FOREST AND RANGELAND RESOURCES FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 2-7 (2016),
https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/resource/RREA StrategicPlan_2012_2016.pdf
(describing federal-state-local partnerships involved in a USDA program designed to
support sustainable rangeland and grassland); Extension, USDA: NAT'L INST. FOOD &
AGRIC., https://nifa.usda.gov/extension (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
187 See How We Work, USDA NAT'L INST. FOOD & AGRIC., https://nifa.usda.gov/how-
we-work (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
188 USDA Local Offices, USDA, https://www.outreach.usda.gov/USDALocalOffices.htm
(last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
189 Cooperative Extension History, supra note 185.
190 See USDA Local Offices, supra note 188.
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and building "420,000 erosion control check-dams" and 4,000 miles
of fence.191 By 1940, the federal Soil Conservation Service had
deployed demonstration projects on "about 70,600 farms comprising
roughly 20,000,000 acres" in more than forty states.192 Later, in
assessing results achieved by the 1935 Soil Conservation Act, the
USDA and its state partners surveyed the owners of "67 percent of all
the private land" in the United States, contacted more than 37,000
"individuals, partnerships, and corporations" and examined
approximately 200,000 soil samples taken by a state program using
federal funding.193 The agency also held "about 9,000 public
participation meetings, attended by over 164,000 persons."194 The
long history of federal involvement in agricultural policy
experimentation shows that the federal government can operate,
independently and in concert with sub-federal entities, at a distinctly
localized scale.
2. Soil Conservation and Experimentation
In addition to including substantial federal participation, many of
the USDA's soil conservation initiatives were genuinely experimental.
The USDA took a body of theory, developed competing hypotheses,
tested them, repeated similar tests in other places, and collected
mountains of data. Those data supported an outpouring of written
studies, which in turn informed additional policy development and
experimentation.
a. Hypotheses and Policy Differentiation
At the time Bennett wrote his report, there were different
hypotheses about how to handle soil conservation policy. Another
agency competing for the funds - the Bureau of Agricultural
Engineering - preferred one national, uniform plan that solely
implemented terracing strategies around the United States.95 Bennett,
however, was firmly committed to a menu of practices that would
differ by region - practices that could be tested through
experimentation and then expanded to farms that operated under
191 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 11.
192 See Bennett, Conservation Work, supra note 15, at 5, 8.
193 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 1, 35 (describing the
Iowa State-led National Resource Inventories).
194 Id. at 5.
195 See HELMS, CREATION, supra note 158, at 9-10.
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similar conditions.196  Congress chose the latter approach.
Consequently, when the USDA began its national soil conservation
experiment in the late 1920s, it was acutely aware of the need to vary
conservation practices to match the unique soils, rainfall levels, and
other conditions around the country, and with farmers' differing
preferences for and abilities to implement control techniques.197 The
federal government therefore decided to test this range of hypotheses,
rather than a singular approach, through its experiment stations and
demonstration projects across the United States.198
Federal agencies did this testing through a deliberate program of
differentiation. In part, this differentiation flowed from the geography
of the new experiment locations. A key point of locating the
experiment stations and then the soil conservation district offices
around the country was to allow implementation of different policies
in different places. For example, in desert areas the Corps collected
native seeds that would best grow in an arid climate and would help to
stabilize grazing areas.199 And the Soil Conservation Service
demonstration projects in the Pacific Northwest promoted winter
cover crops because of the heavy winter rainfall in this area.200 Indeed,
the overall approach at this time, according to USDA historians, was to
use the experiment stations and projects to develop a conservation
system "tailored to the individual farm."20' Another central purpose in
locating the experiment stations around the country was to
demonstrate and persuade: the federal government aimed to convince
farmers of the efficacy of successful conservation practices.
In addition to varying soil conservation approaches among
localities, USDA also varied its approaches within localities, testing
196 See infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
197 See Helms, The Civilian Conservation, supra note 15, at 185 ("To Bennett's
thinking, erosion had to be reduced through a coordinated effort that allowed farmers
to continue farming without reducing income. . .. Bennett's years of observation had
taught him to be wary of single-method approaches that could create new problems
while mitigating existing ones."); id. at 186 (noting that farmers were amenable to
practices such as planting alfalfa in strip crops, which helped to reduce erosion, but
that they struggled to implement these types of practices due to the cost of seed and
fertilizer).
198 See, e.g., Bennett, Conservation Work, supra note 15, at 5-8, 10 (describing the
demonstration projects in place as of 1940, which covered approximately "70,600
farms comprising roughly 20,000,000 acres," as well as "120 field stations").
199 See Helms, Two Centuries, supra note 15, at 26.
200 See Helms, The Civilian Conservation, supra note 15, at 188.
201 Helms, SCS, supra note 162, at 48. In other circumstances, the Corps applied
national strategies deemed to be effective in most regions, such as fencing cattle out of
areas prone to erosion. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 11.
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alternative hypotheses and then emphasizing successful approaches.
For example, at the San Dimas watershed experiment station in
California, Civilian Conservation Corps ("CCC") workers tested the
hypothesis that keeping vegetative cover on fields to trap water was
important to replenish groundwater supplies - and specifically, that
the water-trapping benefits were more important than the soil health
benefits achieved from burning crops.202 CCC workers built special
structures to capture surface water and allow it to percolate through
soil to groundwater, thus helping to measure the importance of
cover.203 Similarly, Walter Lowdermilk, a prominent agency scientist,
completed several studies designed to isolate the factors that
contributed to erosion in different types of watersheds and to transfer
this knowledge into policy - providing what he described as a "basis
for enlightened management."204 Similar studies at other research
stations tested hypotheses regarding how to best measure soil runoff
and erosion (and thus how to best measure the effectiveness of soil
conservation policies).205
b. Control of Confounding Variables
As the previous examples suggest, USDA scientists thought carefully
about using structured differentiation to produce meaningful
experimental results. Often, that care included setting up control
groups. At the original ten research stations established by the federal
government, for example, staff deliberately created "control plots"206
to account for variables other than soil conservation practices that
affect erosion.207 Similarly, Lowdermilk pioneered techniques to
202 See Douglas Helms, Walter Lowdermilk's Journey: Forester to Land
Conservationist, 8 ENVTL. REv. 132, 138 (1984) [hereinafter Forester to Land
Conservationist].
203 Id.
204 Id. (quoting Walter C. Lowdermilk, Further Studies of Factors Affecting Surficial
Run-Off and Erosion, 1929 PROC. INT'L CONGRESS FORESTRY EXPERIMENT STATIONS 625
(1929)).
205 Id. at 139.
206 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 10.
207 Lowdermilk was inspired in part by experiments that he observed at forestry
experiment stations abroad. These stations involved carefully controlled "sample
plots" with measurements of different treatments, such as different amounts of tree
thinning, and various results from these treatments, such as sizes of trees and soil
composition. SWEDISH INST. OF EXPERIMENTAL FORESTRY, GUIDE TO THE ExcuRSIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF FORESTRY EXPERIMENTAL STATIONS 1-19 (1929); see
Helms, Forester to Land Conservationist, supra note 202, at 138 (noting Lowdermilk's
participation in the Stockholm meeting).
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control the many factors that confound efforts to measure the causes
of soil erosion at watershed scales.208 At the experiment stations, and
in studies preceding these stations, Lowdermilk accordingly
endeavored to "isolate various factors at work" in soil erosion and
"measure their influences separately" in individualized plots with
carefully-controlled variables.209 The specialized structures built by
CCC workers in the San Dimas watershed were also part of an effort to
demonstrate the independent effects of certain crops and other
techniques. Other experimentation stations deployed similar control
techniques to isolate variables and identify the most effective erosion
control practices.210
c. Data Collection, Analysis, and Documentation
The most rigorous experimental aspects of federal soil conservation
involve data collection, analysis, and documentation. Relatively early
on, executive and congressional directives required the USDA to try to
determine whether its experiments were working. In other words, they
required the USDA to collect and analyze data on the effectiveness of
soil conservation practices.211 Staff at federal and federal-state
experiment stations embarked upon careful data collection and
reporting efforts, describing experimental techniques and results in a
series of detailed reports published both through federal agencieS21 2
and in peer-reviewed science journals.213 By 1940, Bennett noted that
208 A watershed is an area in which all surface water runoff flows into one water
source, such as a stream, river, or lake. Measuring or modeling soil erosion at this
scale can be complex, particularly if the watershed contains a variety of soil and land
cover types. See Helms, Forester to Land Conservationist, supra note 202, at 136 ("In an
open [watershed] setting there were too many variables.").
209 Walter C. Lowdermilk, Studies in the Role of Forest Vegetation in Surficial Run-
Off and Soil Erosion, 12 AGRIc. ENGINEERING 107, 108 (1931).
210 See HELMS, CREATION, supra note 158, at 6.
211 Over time, just as the focus of the National Resources Conservation Service has
expanded to issues beyond soil conservation, so, too, has the focus of data collection
and analysis. For a discussion of the expansion of USDA with special attention to
conservation issues beyond the preservation of soil, see C.W. Richardson et al., The
Conservation Effects Assessment Project Benchmark Watersheds: Synthesis of Preliminary
Findings, 63 J. SoIL & WATER CONSERVATION 590, 590 (2008).
212 See, e.g., BUREAU OF PUB. RDS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SECOND PROGRESS REPORT ON
EROSION AND RUN-OFF EXPERIMENTS IN PIEDMONT, NORTH CAROLINA (1929) (written "in
cooperation with the North Carolina Department of Agriculture").
213 See, e.g., Lowdermilk, supra note 209. Publication of experimental data and
results has continued through the present. See generally R.B. Bryant et al., Cannonsville
Reservoir and Town Brook Watersheds: Documenting Conservation Efforts to Protect New
York City's Drinking Water, 63 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 339 (2008); J. Cho et
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the Soil Conservation Service "had made hundreds of thousands of
quantitative measurements of soil and water losses from rains at
different intensities and durations," with 300,000 measurements taken
at just one experiment station over an eleven-year period.214
Widespread data collection and analysis in this area continue to the
present day. The USDA uses its wide network of state and local offices
to help with the massive task of determining how and where soil is
eroding and to plug these data into models. For example, local Natural
Resource Conservation Field Offices help to identify the farms that
participate in USDA conservation programs and the specific
conservation practices used on individual farms.215 Independently and
in collaboration with state and local governments, the Soil
Conservation Service has completed hundreds of detailed studies of
reduced soil erosion.216 The results from these studies provide
quantitative support for effective soil conservation practices2 17 and
al., Water Quality Effects of Simulated Conservation Practice Scenarios in the Little River
Experimental Watershed, 65 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 463 (2010); G.W.
Feyereisen et al., Long-term Stream Chemistry Trends in the Southern Georgia Little
River Experimental Watershed, 63 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 475 (2008); R.D.
Harmel et al., Conservation Effects Assessment Project Research in the Leon River and
Riesel Watersheds, 63 J. SoIL & WATER CONSERVATION 453 (2008); Douglas L. Karlen et
al., Is No-Tillage Enough? A Field-Scale Watershed Assessment of Conservation Effects, 7
ELECTRONIC J. INTEGRATIVE BIOScIENCES 1 (2009); R.A. Kuhnle et al., Conservation
Practice Effects on Sediment Load in the Goodwin Creek Experimental Watershed, 63 J.
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 496 (2008); R.N. Lerch et al., Overview of the Mark
Twain Lake/Salt River Basin Conservation Effects Assessment Project, 63 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION 345 (2008); G.W. McCarty et al., Water Quality and Conservation
Practice Effects in the Choptank River Watershed, 63 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 461
(2008); A. Simon & L. Klimetz, Relative Magnitudes and Sources of Sediment in
Benchmark Watersheds of the Conservation Effects Assessment Project, 63 J. SOIL &
WATER CONSERVATION 504 (2008).
214 Hearing on S. 2549, supra note 175, at 8.
215 Maurice J. Mausbach & Allen R. Dedrick, The Length We Go: Measuring
Environmental Benefits of Conservation Practices, 59 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
96A, 100A (2004).
216 See, e.g., R.F. Cullum et al., Effects of Conservation Reserve Program on Runoff
and Lake Water Quality in an Oxbow Lake Watershed, 5 J. INT'L ENVTL. APPLICATION &
Sci. 318 (2010); Karlen et al., supra note 213, at 1; R.A. Kuhnle et al., supra note 213,
at 496.
217 In 1989 USDA studies triggered by an executive initiative began to "quantify
environmental effects of conservation practices at the field scale." Richardson et al.,
supra note 211, at 590. And in 2002, when Congress significantly increased funding
for agricultural conservation practices, Congress also mandated a study with similar
quantification goals, leading to the creation of the USDA's Conservation Effects
Assessment Project. Id. at 590-91. The CEAP, implemented through the USDA's
Agricultural Research Service and cooperative extensions, id., will provide "in-depth
quantification of water quality and soil quality impacts of conservation practices at the
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inform and improve detailed and frequently-updated national models.
Those models then provide broader predictions about the effectiveness
of soil conservation practices where a particular watershed has not
been studied.218
The data collected as part of this effort are extensive, to say the least.
For example, to assess the effects of USDA conservation practices on
croplands, USDA now relies on samples from 71,000 to 72,000
different land segments - a subset of a larger inventory of samples
originally collected by "thousands" of Soil Conservation Service
agents.219 USDA staff also rely on data from USDA field offices to
obtain specific information about crops and "unique landscape
features," among other data not included in the samples.220 They
additionally conduct farmer surveys and "other one-time special
studies" to supplement the sample information.221 Rarely are agencies
this committed to meaningful data collection and analysis of the policy
tools that they implement, but the USDA is somewhat uniquely
positioned in this endeavor. The Agricultural Resource Service, which
employs 2000 scientists,222 collects detailed data on the impacts of
various erosion control practices and other conservation practices
local level," such as reduced nutrients, pesticides, and sediments entering water
bodies. Lisa F. Duriancik et al., The First Five Years of the Conservation Effects
Assessment Project, 63 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 185A, 185A, 187A (2008); see
also Mausbach & Dedrick, supra note 215, at 97A. The CEAP also aims to improve
and validate existing models and help "[dl evelop policy-planning tools to aid selection
and placement of conservation practices for optimal environmental quality," among
other goals. Richardson et al., supra note 211, at 591. Thus, an express function of this
extensive data-driven effort is to improve soil conservation policy. Fourteen
watersheds have been identified as "benchmark watersheds" for the CEAP; in many of
these watersheds the ARS already had begun the work of quantifying soil erosion and
practices designed to limit it, and thus these areas serve as "benchmarks" or
comparison points for how to best measure the effects of conservation practices in
other watersheds. Id.
218 See, e.g., P.W. Gassman et al., The Soil and Water Assessment Tool: Historical
Development, Applications, and Future Research Directions, 50 AM. Soc'Y OF AGRIC. &
BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERS 1211, 1211-12 (2007) (describing the models).
219 USDA, 2012 NATURAL RESOURCES INVENTORY SUMMARY REPORT 7-2 (2015),
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/nternet/FSE DOCUMENTS/nrcseprd396218.pdf [hereinafter
2012 RESOURCES INVENTORY]. The USDA used existing NRI soil sample points but had to
survey farmers to get more information about these samples and the conservation practices
at the farms from which the samples were taken. Cropland National Assessment, USDA: NAT.
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERv., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detaill
national/technical/nra/ceap/na/?cid=nrcsl43 014144 (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
220 USDA, 2012 RESOURCES INVENTORY, supra note 219, at 7-2 to 7-3.
221 Id. at 1-2.
222 About ARS, USDA, https://www.ars.usda.gov/about-ars/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2018).
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incentivized through federal programs, and it has done so for quite a
long time.223
The data also do not just sit on shelves. Many of the scientific
reports describing the USDA studies conducted in watersheds around
the United States end with recommendations for applying these
practices elsewhere or observations about the specific effectiveness of
specific conservation approaches.224 And the USDA incorporates these
lessons learned directly into policy, modifying its guidance provided
to farmers who wish to receive federal funding by implementing
USDA-approved, conservation measures.225
d. Repetition and Variation of Experiments
In carrying out its soil conservation experiments, the federal
government has also made a concerted effort to test and re-test
hypotheses.226 It has followed this practice since the formation of the
223 Since the 1980s, scientists within the service have developed and applied
complex models that attempt to measure the amount of soil and other substances
eroding from farms and ranches and entering waters within a particular region.
Gassman et al., supra note 218, at 1212. These models allow different conservation
practices to be plugged in and "simulated," thus demonstrating the likely effectiveness
of the practices in particular regions. Id. at 1213. A 2007 survey of scientists' uses of
and improvements to the models, both within the United States and internationally,
lists more than 115 scientific papers, with several of the papers using the model in
multiple U.S. watersheds. Id. at 1217-24. A widely-used ARS model - the Soil and
Water Assessment Tool - has been specifically applied to "assess the benefits of
[USDA] conservation practices" at the national level and "for watersheds of varying
sizes that are representative of different regional conditions and mixes of conservation
practices." Id. at 1215.
224 See, e.g., Cullum et al., supra note 216, at 325 ("All physical and chemical water
quality data from the runoff from these drainage ditches provided support for the
hypothesis that improvement in edge-of-field water quality can be demonstrated via
land placed in the Conservation Reserve Program."); Kuhnle et al., supra note 213, at
502 (noting that in watersheds subject to a particular type of erosion ("channel
erosion"), both the amount of loose soil on the surface (due to a lack of crop cover,
for example), and water carrying that soil through runoff contribute to erosion, and
that these factors must be considered in designing conservation practices).
225 See, e.g., Richardson et al., supra note 211, at 590 (noting that the Conservation
Effects Assessment Project provides data that inform programs like the Conservation
Reserve Program, through which the USDA pays farmers to, for example, plant trees
rather than corn, and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, in which
farmers follow USDA guidance in implementing conservation measures and receive
federal funding for this implementation).
226 See, e.g., Karlen et al., supra note 213, at 1-2 (noting that "although previous
studies had suggested that reduced tillage and extended cropping systems would be
more sustainable than the continuous corn grown on the site since the early 1960s,
quantitative evidence was lacking").
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first experiment stations, when government scientists tested results on
farms near the research stations.227 In a 1930 cooperative extension
publication from Oklahoma, for example, the Extension Engineer
noted that for the terracing of soil, the USDA sent an agricultural
engineer to study effective practices in the Southeast. The engineer
published his findings in 1917, and, from studies of "the Carolinas,
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi," "it was found that . .. .[terracing
efforts] on the farm of Mr. P. H. Mangum near Wake Forest, North
Carolina, most nearly gave the desired results and were therefore to be
recommended to other farmers."228 State extension services then
applied and modified this technique elsewhere, "carefully" noting
when the terraces failed and why.229 In addition to retesting
hypotheses, the USDA uses experiments throughout the United States
to validate and refine its models.230
In summary, a birds-eye view of the federal effort to encourage
sound soil conservation policies reveals a surprisingly rigorous and
highly localized set of experiments, in which the federal government
has consistently been a central player.
C. "Playing with Fire"2 31
The federal program of soil experimentation upends some of the
assumptions of the traditional federalism literature, and it was not a
unique outlier. Over the course of the twentieth century, American
wildfire policy underwent a dramatic transformation.232 That
transformation ultimately involved both congressional policymaking
and state actions, but the primary driver of change was a program of
deliberate policy experimentation within the federal bureaucracy.
Indeed, in the terms of our matrix in Part III.A, this was almost a box
H/I experiment. Experimental rigor was high, and the program was
even more federally-centered than the USDA's work with soils.
227 See Gassman et al., supra note 218, at 1215.
228 MARTIN, supra note 143, at 6-7.
229 Id. at 7.
230 Richardson et al., supra note 211, at 591.
231 John McLaughlin, Restoring Fire to the Environment in Sequoia and Kings Canyon
National Parks, 12 PROC. OF THE TALL TIMBERS FIRE ECOLOGY CONF. 391, 394 (1973) ("I
suppose one could say we are playing with fire . . . .").
232 See generally Stephen J. Pyne, Between Two Fires: The Past and Future of Fire in
America, 18 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 129 (2010) (providing an overview of this history).
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For most of the twentieth century, American wildfire policy was
dominated by a single, clear idea: put it out, and quickly.233 Bolstered
by congressional funding, a management ethos partially forged in the
wet forests of Europe, a desire to preserve trees for harvesting rather
than combustion,234 and, eventually, surplus military gear, and
cheered on by Smokey the Bear, federal agencies launched an all-out
effort to suppress every fire that appeared on the public lands.235 By
the 1930s, that ambition hardened into a simple rule: every fire should
be out by 10:00 AM the day after it was spotted.236 The United States
Forest Service led the crusade against wildfire, but other federal
agencies followed suit, as did many states.237 Only in the southeast did
widespread tolerance for both wildfire and prescribed burning
remain.238
From the outset, however, some forest managers expressed doubt
about this policy, and by the 1960s, the doubts were beginning to
swell.239 Particularly at the University of California, Berkeley and at
San Jose State University, forest scientists began resurrecting the old
view that fire was a natural and desirable part of many ecosystems.240
It could not be suppressed forever, they argued, for fuel buildup
would only increase, and the fires that eventually did burn would be
233 See Jan W. van Wagtendonk, The Evolution of National Park Service Fire Policy,
52 FIRE MGMT. NOTES 10, 10-14 (1991).
234 This desire was not shared by the National Park Service, but it was central to
Forest Service culture.
235 See Scott L. Stephens & Neil G. Sugihara, Fire Management and Policy Since
European Settlement, in FIRE IN CALIFORNIA'S ECOSYSTEMS 431, 433-34 (Neil G. Sugihara
ed., 2006); George Busenberg, Wildfire Management in the United States: The Evolution
of a Policy Failure, 21 REV. POL'Y RES. 145, 148-52 (2004) (describing this evolution).
236 Stephens & Sugihara, supra note 235, at 434.
237 See Jim Brenner & Dale Wade, Florida's Revised Prescribed Fire Law: Protection
for Responsible Burners, in PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE CONF. 2000: THE FIRST NATIONAL
CONGRESS ON FIRE ECOLOGY, PREVENTION, AND MANAGEMENT 132, 132 (Krista E.M.
Galley et al. eds., 2003) ("During the early part of the 20th century, the use of fire as a
management ool by state and federal agencies was seen by the forestry community as
anathema.").
238 See id. at 133 ("Florida has led the nation in acreage treated with prescribed fire
every year since records have been kept.").
239 See Stephen J. Pyne, Resistance, Restoration, Resilience: A Survey of Fire's
American Century, 48 ARIz. ST. L.J. 53, 55 (2016) ("One side argued that fire
suppression was misguided and that the proper strategy was to 'light burn' the
montane forests as the Indians had."); Stephens & Sugihara, supra note 235, at 433
(describing opposition in the 1880s); Jan W. van Wagtendonk, The History and
Evolution of Wildland Fire Use, 3 FIRE ECOLOGY 3, 4-5 (2007) (describing skepticism
from park managers even during the height of "the fire protection years").
240 See van Wagtendonk, supra note 233, at 11-12.
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enormous, dangerous, and ecologically catastrophic.241 Their
arguments found a sympathetic audience in Starker Leopold, a
prominent ecologist who, in 1963, wrote a report for the Department
of the Interior recommending more ecology-based management of
public lands.242 But turning fires loose on lands where they had been
suppressed for decades - and suppressed with almost religious zeal
- was not the kind of radical policy change that could happen all at
once. Instead, scientists and federal land managers needed sites for
experimentation.
They found those sites scattered around the west.243 In Sequoia,
Kings Canyon, and Yosemite National Parks, managers began
experimenting with controlled burns.244 The Forest Service's attitude
toward this new approach was more tepid, but managers in the
Selway-Bitterroot and Gila National Forests also conducted prescribed
burns.245 And while authors often throw the word "experiment"
around somewhat indiscriminately, in this context it is accurate.
Forest managers took a growing body of theory, developed hypotheses
from it, and tested those hypotheses through carefully observed
trials.246 Rather than just running their experiments once, they
repeated them at other sites.247 And because adjacent forests did not
burn, and there were many areas where fire suppression remained the
dominant policy, there was no shortage of control areas with which
scientists could draw comparisons. The resulting burns generated an
abundance of data, which federal land managers and external
241 See Scott L. Stephens & Lawrence W. Ruth, Federal Forest-Fire Policy in the
United States, 15 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 532, 533 (2005) (describing the
consequences of, and growing skepticism about, fire suppression).
242 Id. at 533; see also A. STARKER LEOPOLD ET AL., WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN THE
NATIONAL PARKS 12 (1963).
243 In the early 1950s, the Park Service had experimented with controlled burns in
the Everglades. See Bruce M. Kilgore, Fire Management in the National Parks: An
Overview, 14 PROC. OF THE TALL TIMBERS FIRE ECOLOGY CONF. 45, 46 (1976). But until
the early 1970s, the Everglades experiment remained exceptional. Id.
244 See Carol Miller, The Contribution of Natural Fire Management to Wilderness Fire
Science, 20 INT'LJ. WILDERNESS 20, 20-21 (2014); Peter H. Schuft, A Prescribed Burning
Program for Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks, 12 PROC. TALL TIMBERS FIRE
ECOLOGY CONF. 377, 380 (1973); see also Jerry Lester & Eleanore Browning, UC
Foresters Aid Fire Ecology Program at Yosemite Park, 25 CAL. AGRIC. 1, 3 (1971).
245 Stephens & Ruth, supra note 241, at 533.
246 See Kilgore, supra note 243, at 50-51 (describing the importance of "carefully
controlled laboratory and field studies" carried out in conjunction with university and
Forest Service scientists).
247 See id. at 47 (describing burning experiments in a variety of different ecological
settings).
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scientists used to generate a huge outpouring of written research
studies.248 Land managers also began hosting annual conferences to
discuss their findings.249 And ideas spread. A let-it-burn strategy went
from being the hypothesis for a few isolated experiments on a few
acres in a few national forests and parks to a key part of national fire
policies.250
That transition was not always smooth, partly because this was also
an experiment in public acceptance of modified fire practices. Public
outrage after 1988's enormous fires in Yellowstone National Park, and
after a prescribed burn ran out of control and rampaged through Los
Alamos, New Mexico, undercut the agencies' embrace of fire.251 Today,
many fire scientists agree that the embrace - particularly by the
Forest Service - still is not nearly enthusiastic enough.252 Across the
American West, forests still contain a dangerous overabundance of
fuel, and that is partly a result of continued fire suppression, which in
turn arises from a complex set of incentives that reward land managers
more for reactive firefighting than for preventive management.253
Nevertheless, real changes have taken place, even if they have not
gone as far as they should. And the process does bear nearly all the
hallmarks of a deliberate program of policy experimentation. Double-
blind, randomized controlled trials did not happen, but the program
included hypotheses grounded in theory, deliberate policy
differentiation, repeated testing, observation and data collection, and
analysis and dissemination of outcomes; policy changed as a result.
Another feature of the story of fire experimentation merits
emphasis: most experiments took place on, and the vast majority of
the research studies emerged from, the federal lands.2 54 Federal lands
248 For a compilation of papers, see Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks: Fire
Research Papers, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/seki/learn/nature/fic
fireres.htm (last updatedJuly, 22 2016) [hereinafter Sequoia and Kings Canyon].
249 Many of the papers cited here come from the proceedings of the Tall Timbers
Fire Ecology Conference.
250 See Kilgore, supra note 243, at 47-48 (describing the spreading of the Park
Service's let-it-burn policy); Stephens & Ruth, supra note 241, at 534 (describing
changes to federal fire policies).
251 See van Wagtendonk, supra note 233, at 8, 11.
252 See, e.g., Scott L. Stephens et al., U.S. Federal Fire and Forest Policy: Emphasizing
Resilience in Dry Forests, 7 ECOSPHERE 1, 2 (2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1002/ecs2.1584/full.
253 See id. at 6-7.
254 See, e.g., Sequoia and Kings Canyon, supra note 248. The compilation of papers
at this site is just a partial compendium of the large literature on federal forest fire
management, yet it still contains many more papers than we have been able to find
about state law. See Lauren Wishnie, Fire and Federalism, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1006,
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also were the initial focus of policy reform.255 And the reforms came
from agencies, not Congress or the White House. While elected
officials did eventually get in on the policy reforms, they waited until
2003, over three decades after the federal bureaucracy's experimental
program began.256 That does not mean the federal government acted
entirely independently; during this same period, there were some state
experiments with controlled burns. Florida continued to be a leader,
and California set prescribed burns in several of its state parks.257
Some of the scientists who helped instigate the process also worked at
state universities.258 But many state policies, particularly in the West,
still reflect the old suppress-everything ethos, as do private land
management strategies.259
The reliance on federal lands for this experiment provides one
obvious explanation for federal agency leadership in this area.
Historical contingency also played a role; by the time the program of
experimentation began, the federal government had long since
established its leadership in the field of forest fire management - with
increasingly poor results.260 But those explanations, though accurate,
1015 (2008) (noting "the preeminent position of the federal agencies" in wildfire
policy, though also discussing state involvement).
255 See Stephens & Ruth, supra note 241, at 536. States also have become
increasingly involved in fire planning, particularly for "urban-wildland interface" areas
where dispersed rural settlement brings people into fire-prone areas.
256 See Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of
Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 312-13 (2006) ("Remarkably, the [Healthy
Forests Restoration Act of 2013] represents the first significant federal legislation on
the role and management of fire on the public lands.").
257 W. James Barry & R. Wayne Harrison, Prescribed Burning in the California State
Park System, 1997 PROC. SYMP. ON FIRE CAL. ECOSYSTEMS: INTEGRATING ECOLOGY,
PREVENTION & MGMT. 203, 204-06. Interestingly, the state park prescribed burning
program was encouraged by Harold Biswell, a UC Berkeley scientist who had also
worked with the National Park Service, and National Park Service scientists helped
train state agency staff. Id. at 206.
258 See Kilgore, supra note 243, at 46.
259 See Karen Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 445, 452-53 & n.30 (2010) (describing differences between federal and state
policies); Michelle M. Steen-Adams et al., Historical Perspective on the Influence of
Wildfire Policy, Law, and Informal Institutions on Management and Forest Resilience in a
Multiownership, Frequent-Fire, Coupled Human and Natural System in Oregon, USA, 22
ECOLOGY & Soc'Y, no. 3, 2017, at 7 (finding, in a comparative study of public and
private forest management in Oregon, that "[i]n general, private owners have
responded to increased wildfire hazard in frequent-fire forests with comparatively
limited adaptation ... yet have not shifted away from the past practices of stages 1-Il
that historically contributed to fuel accumulation" and describing how Oregon state
law emphasizes complete fire suppression and slowed the pace of federal reform).
260 See Busenberg, supra note 235, at 149-50 (describing this federal role and its
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are incomplete. Private forests (which states regulate) and state-owned
forests are also abundant and sometimes are more fire-prone than
nearby federal lands.261 State and private owners therefore had
incentives to undertake similar reforms, even though most did not do
So.
2 6 2 Similarly, Congress, which funds a shockingly expensive fire
suppression program, had ample reason to pursue innovation, but did
not.263 That suggests that some distinctive advantages of the federal
bureaucracy - specifically, its combination of decentralized local
management units and a national coordinating superstructure - made
it particularly well suited for carrying out an experimental program.
As one National Park Service scientist later explained, "[National Park
Service] fire policies have evolved in a pattern of leaps forward
followed by experimentation and refinement. The decentralized nature
of the agency allows it to take advantage of new philosophical ideas
and translate them into policy."
264
The story of playing with fire thus underscores some of the same
basic points as our discussion of soil management. The first is that
while state and local governments may sometimes be laboratories of
democracy, they are not the only laboratories. For some policy arenas,
federal agencies may be much more promising crucibles of
experimental reform. Second, while federal experimental programs
can be carried out in close coordination with the states, as was the
case with key parts of the USDA's soil management program, the
federal government also can act fairly independently. In other words,
our laboratories of democracy may be intertwined with, or largely
outside of, the structures of federalism.
D. Race to the Top
Our third case study involves a very different policy realm. In 2009,
the Department of Education launched a reform program called Race
consequences).
261 See, e.g., Steen-Adams et al., supra note 259 (finding, in a study of Oregon
forests, that "private corporate forests are more vulnerable to wildfire than are other
large ownerships because of the comparatively high proportion of frequent-fire
forest").
262 See Amanda Hemmerich, From Fire Comes Life: Why Courts Assessing Forest Fire
Damages Should Recognize Ecological Benefits, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10608, 10608 (2016) (describing costly settlements of litigation over forest fires that
began on private land).
263 See Bradshaw, supra note 259, 449-50 (providing distressing statistics on the
costs of firefighting).
264 van Wagtendonk, supra note 233, at 14.
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to the Top.265 Like the federal experiments with soil and fire, Race to
the Top was a federally-instigated program designed to spur policy
innovation.266 But unlike the soil and fire programs, the field staff
implementing the program were state and local teachers and
administrators, not federal employees.267 Race to the Top thus
exploited, rather than worked around, the political structures of
federalism.268
The Race to the Top program sought to improve the quality of
primary and secondary school education across the United States.269
Its creators had ambitious ideas about improving teacher training,
school administration, transparency, and accountability.270 But unlike
the Park Service or the Forest Service, which could experiment on
federal lands, the Department of Education ("DOE") did not have
federal schools to use as its laboratories. And in contrast to the USDA,
which began its soil experimentation during a period when the Great
Depression had shattered state credibility and opened new possibilities
for federal intervention, DOE did not have the political capital to
simply take over the field of education reform.271 Indeed, the most
recent federal expansion into the field of education reform - the No
Child Left Behind Act - had already become deeply unpopular.272
Consequently, DOE turned to a program of competitive and
conditional grants to influence policy.2 7 3 On its own, that approach is
nothing new; using the federal spending power to influence state and
local action is now commonplace.274 But this particular grant program
265 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 67.
266 Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund; Notice Inviting Applications for
New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,836, 59,836 (Nov. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Race to the Top Fund] (describing the program purposes).
267 See generally id. (calling for state and local implementation).
268 See generally Martin Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education
Federalism, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 570-71 (2015) (analyzing Race to the Top as part
of an emerging new federalism model).
269 Id. at 571.
270 William G. Howell, Results of President Obama's Race to the Top, 15 EDUC. NEXT
58, 60 (2015) (noting the degree of control exercised by the Department of
Education).
271 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 22-24 (1990).
272 See Kurzweil, supra note 268, at 601-02 (describing opposition).
273 See Race to the Top Fund, supra note 266, at 59,836; DEP'T OF EDUC., SETTING
THE PACE: EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICA'S STUDENTS UNDER RACE TO THE TOP 1-
2 (2014).
274 See Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement, supra note 126, at 260-66 (describing the
scope of federal grantmaking programs).
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was distinctive in a few ways. First, the federal government carefully
defined the goals of the program. Rather than simply authorizing state
and local governments to apply for money to improve education, it
demanded programs to improve outcomes in four specific subject
areas.275 DOE did not explain exactly how it expected state and local
governments to achieve all of those goals,276 or how much
improvement it expected them to achieve; the idea, instead, was to let
state and local governments test out and learn from different
approaches.277 But by incorporating each of those goals into its scoring
metric for grant applications, DOE ensured that states that received
grants would direct their experimentation toward goals of the federal
government's choosing.278
Second, DOE created an elaborate system designed to facilitate data-
gathering and learning. The DOE explained,
[Grantee states] must make available, through formal (e.g.,
peer-reviewed journals) or informal (e.g., newsletters, Web
sites) mechanisms, the results of any evaluations they conduct
of their funded activities. In addition, . . . Race to the Top
States, [local educational agencies], and schools are expected
to identify and share promising practices, make work available
within and across States, and make data available in
appropriate ways to stakeholders and researchers so as to help
all States focus on continuous improvement in service of
student outcomes.2
7 9
275 Race to the Top Fund, supra note 266, at 59,836. Those goals were:
(a) Adopting internationally-benchmarked standards and assessments
that prepare students for success in college and the workplace;
(b) Building data systems that measure student success and inform
teachers and principals in how they can improve their practices;
(c) Increasing teacher effectiveness and achieving equity in teacher
distribution; and
(d) Turning around our lowest-achieving schools.
276 Some of the criteria were so specific that they left little room for flexibility. See
Kurzweil, supra note 268, at 603-04 (noting examples).
277 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 67, at vii.
278 See Race to the Top Fund, supra 266, at 59,842-45 (defining criteria); Howell,
supra note 270, at 60 (noting the degree of control exercised by the Department of
Education).
279 Race to the Top Fund, supra note 266, at 59,838 (parentheses in original).
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DOE also called for the Institute of Educational Services to perform
several national evaluations of the effects of Race to the Top grants.280
Despite those features, describing Race to the Top as a rigorously
experimental program would be inaccurate. DOE did not require its
grantee states to establish control groups - instead, it expected
statewide policy changes - and in that key sense, the program
architects prioritized getting reforms in place over facilitating
experimental learning.281 Nor did DOE itself advertise its program as
experimental. That word is prominently absent from the Federal
Register notices soliciting grant applications, and while it does appear
occasionally in DOE's own reports upon the program, "innovation"
instead was DOE's term of choice.282 But the commitment to data
collection and results dissemination, the maintenance of some control
over variables (through the menu of options that states could select),
and the reservation of latitude for interstate variation, still sets Race to
the Top far apart from a program that simply attempts to push states
toward a new set of federally-favored policies.
The resulting program thus bears some resemblance to the
governance architecture called for by democratic experimentalism
scholars, some of whom have leaped to claim Race to the Top as a
reflection of their ideas.283 But there are also key differences.
Democratic experimentalism, in the classic account, involves the
federal government primarily as a facilitator and as a vector for
learning, while state and local governments take the lead in actually
defining policy goals and selecting benchmarks.284 In Race to the Top,
in contrast, the federal government was more than just a facilitator,
though it certainly did play that role. It also defined the goals.
280 Id.
281 See id. at 59,842 (demanding plans for "statewide" improvement). The
Department of Education also favored applications from states that were adopting the
Common Core curricular standards, and thus encouraged some uniformity among as
well as within states. See id. at 59,843.
282 See, e.g., id. at 59,836 ("The purpose of the Race to the Top Fund ... is to
encourage and reward States that are creating the conditions for education innovation
and reform .... ); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 67, at 49
("States experimented with new approaches to provide districts with the supports and
tools needed to assist low-performing schools and sustain improvements in teaching
and learning.").
283 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 55, at 55-56 (asserting that "the Race to the Top
education program can only be understood in experimentalist terms") (footnote
omitted).
284 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
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Whether this program has improved educational outcomes is hard
to say.285 Early retrospective studies have generally found that Race to
the Top was effective in spurring states to adopt new policies, but
determining whether those policies actually improved student learning
will take more time.286 And while that question is crucially important
to the teachers and students involved, for our purposes it is somewhat
beside the point. Whether or not Race to the Top turns out to have
improved education, it already has demonstrated the possibility of a
program of experimentation - albeit of the moderately rigorous
variety - instigated, directed, and overseen by the federal government
and implemented by local governments and states.
E. Jobs-Plus
A final example of federally-led experimentation - in the area of
welfare policy - is similar to Race to the Top in that it involved the
federal government relying on sub-federal entities to implement an
experiment. But it was also an explicit and quite rigorous experiment,
thus falling within the box labeled "F" in Figure 1 above.
The Jobs-Plus Community Revitalization Initiative for Public
Housing Families ("Jobs-Plus"), which took place from 1998 to 2003,
addressed unemployment and poverty in federally-subsidized housing
projects.287 It was initiated, designed, and funded by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and
nonprofit partners, with the nonprofit group MDRC taking the lead on
implementation.28 8 It used money from a public-private partnership,
285 Many education policy analysts have criticized the program. See, e.g., Natalie
Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance, Accountability, Outsourcing,
45 URB. LAW. 51, 67 (2013) (summarizing criticisms and explaining that "the focus of
the Race to the Top initiative on charter schools, the use of consultants for innovation,
and the use of standardized testing to reform teacher evaluation has been viewed by
some critics as directly related to reports about the increased interest in private
investment in public education as way of accessing a huge pool of public money
without sufficient evidence of effectiveness and without adequate regulatory
oversight").
286 See LISA DRAGOSET ET AL., RACE TO THE Top: IMPLEMENTATION AND RELATIONSHIP
TO STUDENT OUTCOMES XIV-XV (2016), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED569959.pdf;
Howell, supra note 270, at 58.
287 Riccio, SUSTAINED EARNINGS GAINS, supra note 47, at 1; see also DAVID M.
GREENBERG ET AL., THE SECOND GENERATION OF JOBS-PLUS PROGRAMS iii (2015),
https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/CEO-SIFJobs-Plus_2015_FR.pdf (labeling
the initiative as the "Jobs-Plus Public Housing Revitalization Initiative").
288 See HOWARD S. BLOOM & JAMES A. RICCio, USING PLACE-BASED RANDOM
ASSIGNMENT AND COMPARATIVE INTERRUPTED TIME-SERIEs ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE THE
JOBS-PLus EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS 1, 11
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the Social Innovation Fund, which is an evidence-based policy
experimentation branch of the federal Corporation for National and
Community Service.289 HUD and its partners relied on local entities to
implement the program - specifically, at each project site (city)
selected, the "local housing authority, resident representatives, the
welfare department, and the workforce development system" within
the community.290 But MDRC also provided extensive technical
support from the top down.291 The program's goal was to improve
employment for residents of public housing developments, with a
specific hypothesis to be addressed: "Can a multicomponent
employment initiative that is located in public housing developments
help residents work, earn more money, and improve their quality of
life"? 292 The federal and nonprofit project leaders hypothesized "that,
by substantially increasing residents' rates and stability of
employment, other improvements in residents' quality of life would
follow . . . ."293 They further broke down this hypothesis into three
sets of outcomes to be measured, including impacts on the extent to
which residents were prepared for work or for advancement within
their workplace, impacts on actual work outcomes, such as increased
"employment and earnings," less reliance on welfare, and
"[ilmprovements in [p1ersonal [wiell-[bjeing, [ciommunity
[clonditions, and [q]uality-of-[life [o]utcomes," such as safety and
improved conditions within the housing development.294
The "multicomponent initiative" - or, in experimental terms, the
treatment - designed to test this hypothesis included "(1)
employment services offered at on-site job centers, (2) changes in rent
rules that provided financial incentives to work, and (3) community
support for work through neighbor-to-neighbor conversations."295
Employment services included offerings such as helping residents
https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/full-600.pdf [hereinafter PLACE-BASED
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT] (noting that these organizations designed the program and
selected the cities to participate but that MRDC staff and consultants did the work
such as visiting the cities and providing Jobs Plus workshops and training programs).
289 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 287, at iii; Social Innovation Fund, CORP. FOR NAT'L
& COMMUNITY SERv., https://www.nationalservice.gov/programs/social-innovation-
fund (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
290 Social Innovation Fund, supra note 289.
291 See HOWARD S. BLOOM ET AL., PROMOTING WORK IN PUBLIC HOUSING: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OFJOBS-PLUS, at ES-2 (2005) [hereinafter PROMOTING WORK].
292 Id. at iii.
293 Id. at 5-6.
294 Id. at 15.
295 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 287, at iii.
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search for jobs, providing vocational training, and supplying the types
of support that allow people to work, such as transportation and child
care.296 Where the program was implemented, HUD changed rent
policies such that when residents' earnings increased, they did not
have to pay a higher proportion of their rent.29 7 And with respect to
neighbor-to-neighbor communications, the program endeavored to
foster discussions about "job opportunities or employment
services."298
Through a competition, the federal government and its nonprofit
partners selected cities with large public housing developments as sites
for the experiment.299 They also established criteria to be
demonstrated in an application, including prioritizing a "diverse set of
sites where joblessness in public housing was a serious problem" and
where there appeared to be a good opportunity to implement a
program to address the problem, such as demonstrated "quality of
local housing authority management."3 00 Further, the applicants had
to commit to cooperate "with substantial data collection efforts."301
The policy experiment was designed to test the hypotheses noted
above and to attempt to control confounding variables. HUD and its
partners "randomly assign[ed] entire housing developments (rather
than individual residents) to either a program group or a comparison
group within each site,"302 explaining that the method of randomly
allocating groups "was used in order to avoid ... selecting for Jobs-
Plus the best managed of the available developments or those that
enjoyed the most favorable conditions for achieving employment
outcomes."303 Specifically, the local housing authorities selected to
participate had to "have at least two - and preferably three -
developments" within their city "that would qualify for Jobs-Plus."304
The program implementers then used computerized random
generation to pick developments that would receive the Jobs-Plus
296 BLOOM ETAL., PROMOTING WORK, supra note 291, at ES-2.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 BLOOM & RIccIo, PLACE-BASED RANDOM ASSIGNMENT, supra note 288, at 25-26
(noting that 442 housing developments met the criteria, invitations to submit
statements of interest were sent to fifty cities, and forty-one cities responded).
300 BLOOM ET AL., PROMOTING WORK, supra note 291, at 9.
301 Id. at 10.
302 Id. at 12.
303 Id. at 12.
304 Id.
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program within the city and those that would serve as comparison
groups within the same city.3 05
Beyond a concerted effort to establish control groups to account for
confounding variables, the experiment involved extensive data
collection and analysis, with project leaders examining pre- and post-
project earnings trends, among numerous other data points.306 They
collected data from public housing authorities on "residents'
background characteristics and their tenure in public housing" and
also accessed state unemployment records and welfare payment
records.307 Further, researchers conducted baseline and follow-up
surveys of residents within the developments.308 The goal of the data
collection was to measure the success of the program along three
metrics: average increased earnings of residents and percentage of
residents employed; the extent to which the effects varied among the
sites and different residents and resident cohorts; and the extent to
which Jobs-Plus lowered welfare reliance within the developmentS.309
Another classically experimental aspect of Jobs-Plus was the extent
to which the program drew on lessons learned in similar experiments.
The program was designed to build from a set of "comprehensive
community initiatives" that involved entire communities and a broad
set of services, rather than just individuals and individual services, in
efforts to lift individuals out of poverty.310 Jobs-Plus incorporated
similar approaches but deliberately added a "third component" of a
community program that was specifically focused on work support.311
And the program designers looked to similar, recent tests in
Minnesota, Canada, and Wisconsin when forming the Jobs-Plus
experiment.312 Further, researchers later replicated Jobs-Plus in other
communities, examined the results from these programs, and
compared them with the original Jobs-Plus results. The Social
Innovation Fund of the Corporation for National and Community
Service funded a "Jobs-Plus scale-up and replication" in the Bronx and
San Antonio, and HUD is also implementing the program more
broadly under the "Jobs Plus Pilot Program," which commenced in
305 Id. at ES-3.
306 Id. at 67-68.
307 Id. at 14.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 67.
310 BLOOM & RicClo, PLACE-BASED RANDOM ASSIGNMENT, supra note 288, at 22.
311 Id. at 23.
312 Id. at 21-22.
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2015.313 The results of these replications are being documented and
studied.31 4
Retrospective review suggests substantial program success.
Although there appears to have been surprisingly little external review
of the program (and seemingly no meaningful attention in the legal
literature), the limited external assessments are positive. An Urban
Institute report concludes that Jobs-Plus was successful in boosting
residents' earnings,315 although it notes that the increased earnings did
not spill over in terms of "improvements in residents' quality of life or
community well-being" in the three communities tested under this
sub-hypothesis.3 16 More broadly, however, the report notes that Jobs-
Plus, along with two other HUD programs, ."represent serious
investments in rigorous research" and "paid off" in terms of producing
"significant new insights on strategies for tackling concentrated
poverty and isolation."3 17 The authors also observe that the lessons
"should enable policymakers and practitioners to move forward more
intelligently" in terms of steering low-income families toward
neighborhoods that might present more opportunities for moving out
of poverty and designing and providing employment programs and
rent rules in low-income communities.318
Internal program review revealed that at the four sites where the
most complete implementation of Jobs-Plus took place, the program
"markedly increased the earnings of public housing residents"
(emphasis in original) across residential cohorts and subgroups, and
effects on employment rates were positive but not as clear.3 19 At three
of the sites, the "program impacts were sustained for at least four years
and showed no signs of diminishing."320 Later analysis noted that in
the four sites with full Jobs-Plus implementation, "Jobs-Plus boosted
residents' annual earnings by 16 percent, or $1,300 per year, an effect
313 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 287, at ES-1.
314 See id. at 111-13 (noting that the report investigates the early results of the
scale-up and describing further nationwide efforts to implement and study similar
Jobs-Plus programs).
315 MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & LYNETTE A. RAWLINGS, URBAN INST., OVERCOMING
CONCENTRATED POVERTY AND ISOLATION: LESSONS FROM THREE HUD DEMONSTRATION
INITIATIVES 2, 18 (2005), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/5 1636/
311205-Overcoming-Concentrated-Poverty-and-Isolation-Executive-Summary-.PDF.
316 Id. at 19.
317 Id. at 2.
318 Id. at 3.
319 BLOOM ET AL., PROMOTING WORK, supra note 291, at 67.
320 Id. at 68.
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that endured seven years without abating."321 Program residents'
welfare reliance also "dropped precipitously," but because the
researchers had used careful controls and were able to tease out
potential causal factors unrelated to the Jobs-Plus program, they
concluded that the welfare effects were likely the result of changes in
the national economy, among other national variables.322
The Jobs-Plus case study is another example of a rigorous
experiment - similar to the coordinated and carefully-designed soil
conservation policy experiments in the agricultural context - in
which the federal government was centrally involved. HUD was
instrumental in designing and funding the policy initiative and
implementing portions of it, such as helping select the communities to
which the initiative would apply and changing rent policies within
these communities.323 And HUD's primary national non-profit partner
in the experiment, MDRC, was centrally involved in the experiment,
sending "'site representatives' and other experts to provide ongoing
operations-related technical assistance" in each community.324
Combined, these four case studies show varying degrees of federal
involvement and, to some extent, rigor. As we note above, the federal
government did not even describe Race to the Top as an experiment
when it initiated the program. But all of the studies demonstrate that
the federal government often is a central actor within policy
"experimentation" of various types - not just in the role of facilitator
or coordinator but often as a designer and implementer of
experiments.
IV. EXPLAINING FEDERAL EXPERIMENTATION
In American politics and law, the balance of federal and state
authority is a subject of never-ending debate.325 Congress is constantly
deciding the degree to which federal governance should extend itself
into policy realms both new and old, the extent to which the federal
government should preserve state primacy, and how much state
discretion Congress should reserve within the boundaries of federal
321 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 287, at iii.
322 BLOOM ET AL., PROMOTING WORK, supra note 291, at iii, 106.
323 BLOOM & Riccio, PLACE-BASED RANDOM ASSIGNMENT, supra note 288, at 10.
324 Id.
325 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (describing federalism
as "our oldest question of constitutional law").
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programs. Consider, for example, our ongoing debates over health
care policy: the federal-state balance (in a realm crying out for
governmental experimentation) has been a central focus. 326
Administrative agencies repeatedly confront the same questions, and
in a variety of different contexts. So do the courts. Beneath
preemption,327 Commerce Clause,328 and Tenth Amendment cases,329
among others, and beneath statutory interpretation cases involving the
shadows of constitutional law,330 a key underlying question lurks: how
powerful should the states and the federal government be? The
answers to that question rarely turn solely on theories of federalism,
and the desire for policy experimentation is just one part of federalism
theory. But it is an important part. Its prominence within federalism
debates justifies moving beyond the classic mantras of federalism and
exploring how and why governmental experimentation actually
happens.
The case studies in Part III focus on the how questions. They
demonstrate that the federal government can be involved to varying
degrees in programs of policy experimentation, that those programs
can involve varying levels of experimental rigor, and that, despite that
variation, the federal roles can be crucially important. In this final
Part, we ask why the federal government can and often should take on
these roles. In contrast to the traditional federalism literature, which
has generally assumed state primacy in the experimental field or has
critiqued states' experimental potential, we consider whether the
federal government brings distinctive advantages to governmental
experimentation. We conclude that it does. There are structural
features of federal governance - all revealed, to at least some extent,
by our case studies - that explain why lawmakers and advocates
should look to the federal government as a source of experimental
policy.
326 See Michael S. Sparer, Federalism and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010: The Founding Fathers Would Not Be Surprised, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
L. 461, 463-66 (2011).
327 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
328 E.g., Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533-37 (2012).
329 E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997).
330 E.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74
(2001) (invoking principles of constitutional avoidance to reject a statutory
interpretation that would have allowed federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction over
isolated wetlands); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-64 (1991) (using avoidance
principles to narrowly interpret a statute that would have invalidated state laws
mandating age-based retirement for judges).
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A. Perspective
One important comparative advantage of the federal government -
and one that might call for continued federal involvement in policy
areas often viewed as areas of traditional sub-federal control - is its
ability to see a broad problem that requires differentiated approaches.
The Race to the Top, Jobs-Plus, and fire management programs all
involved federal recognition of national problems, and our soil
conservation example is perhaps the best illustration of this point.
Decisions by thousands of individual farmers scattered around the
United States contributed to a massive problem - dust storms caused
by widespread soil erosion - that states and local governments had
not adequately identified or addressed. It took a highly motivated
federal official to draw attention to the problem and trigger an
experimental program, with a central motivator being the aptly-named
report entitled "Soil Erosion, A National Menace."331
B. Differentiation, Coordination, and Communication
When it comes to implementing the experiment and ensuring
differentiated approaches, the federal government again has important
and underappreciated advantages. For reasons outlined in Part II, state
and local government officials are often too risk averse, or tempted by
free riding, to take on this differentiation effort.332 Even with federal
incentives, such as grants or prizes, the federal government might not
be able to inspire systematically differentiated efforts by sub-federal
governments. In many circumstances, therefore, the federal
government itself will be the best experimenter. In other words,
differentiation is sometimes best accomplished when a partially
centralized actor like the federal government, which has both national
headquarters offices and geographically distributed staff, sends agents
to different regions rather than simply enlisting states and local
government as agents.3 3 3 The federal government can directly
implement varied approaches without trying to persuade sub-federal
entities to do so. And even if state or local agents are amenable to
trying different policies - including those that risked lower success
- sending federal employees to run agricultural experiment stations
or to implement different fire management practices can substantially
331 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1980 APPRAISAL, supra note 145, at 9 (emphasis added).
332 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
333 See Owen, Regional Federal Administration, supra note 43, at 109. Parallel
relationships are also possible between state governments, which often have field or
regional offices within their states, and local governments.
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reduce the transaction and monitoring costs that accompany reliance
on subfederal implementers.
The federal government also has a relatively unique ability to ensure
uniform measurement and data collection, as well as to inspire data
sharing across sub-federal borders.334 States and local governments
have little incentive to collectively agree upon a uniform system or to
share results - particularly negative ones.33 5 Where the federal
government has identified a national problem, it has greater
incentives, and the advantage of a semi-centralized regime, when it
comes to taking on this data-intensive effort. This is true even for
problems that play out differently across geographic areas, as
evidenced by forest fire management. The federal government is
incentivized to identify these differences and to tailor policies to
address them. Further, as demonstrated by Race to the Top and Jobs-
Plus, the government can enlist states and local governments in the
data collection effort and can also lead conferences involving federal
experts and sub-federal experimenters, inducing these officials to
share their lessons learned more broadly.336
There are potential counterarguments to these claims. Perhaps the
most obvious is that federal agencies will struggle to differentiate
policy because of their greater removal from regulated entities and
because those efforts would face a legitimacy deficit. The former
argument, though it echoes themes common in federalism discourse,
is often overblown. In fact, as the soil and fire examples illustrate,
federal agency staff are just as close to many problems, if not closer,
than their state counterparts.337
The latter argument is more nuanced and requires a lengthier
response. The argument would start from the premise that, despite all
the rhetoric celebrating policy differentiation, such differentiation is
actually deeply worrisome, for it means deliberately introducing
inconsistency into governance.338 Usually we value treating like cases
334 While states do not share this ability, some private organizations are heavily
involved in semi-governmental activities like standard-setting. See Emily S. Bremer,
American and European Perspectives on Private Standards in Public Law, 91 TUL. L. REV.
325, 326 (2016).
335 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 265-82 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the
Race to the Top and Jobs-Plus programs and lessons learned with respect to future
policy efforts).
337 See supra notes 158-96 and accompanying text (describing the localized staffing
of federal soil conservation initiatives).
338 See Owen, Regional Federal Administration, supra note 43, at 76-77 (noting
recurring concerns about inconsistent federal policies).
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alike, and if an entity is going to establish a different practice, perhaps
that entity should be an elected state legislature rather than an
appointed federal administrator - or that administrator's civil service
staff. That argument thus reflects one of the largest debates in
administrative law, which pits the skeptics of administrative
legitimacy against its advocates, and a full explication of that debate is
beyond the scope of this Article. 339 Our summary response is simply
that we are persuaded by the many arguments in favor of
administrative legitimacy.340 If a federal agency, which will be subject
to legislative, executive, and judicial branch oversight, and whose
actions will be bounded by governing statutory and constitutional law
and by a generalized requirement of reasoned decision-making,
decides to deliberately differentiate policy, and does so in ways
consistent with principles of ethical research, that is a legitimate
course to pursue.
A final concern associated with federal experimentation - and one
that we take quite seriously - was raised when the policy
experimentation term was first coined in 1932. Justice Brandeis
emphasized that a single, courageous state could experiment "without
risk to the rest of the country."341 Some localized or state experimentation
can in fact have significantly negative spillover effects, particularly in
areas where experimentation occurs on resources that cross state lines,
for example.342 Indeed, much of the justification for federal intervention
339 Compare, e.g., E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Too many important decisions of the Federal
Government are made nowadays by unelected agency officials exercising broad
lawmaking authority, rather than by the people's representatives in Congress."), with
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1511, 1542-62 (1992) (arguing that the deliberative processes of agencies
compare favorably with those of legislatures). For a relatively recent distillation of
arguments on both sides, see generally the majority and dissenting opinions in Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
340 See, e.g., Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 313,
359-64 (2013) (describing how court's formal requirements for agency legitimacy can
be translated into broader metrics to independently assess an agency's legitimacy, such
as avoiding arbitrary action and protecting democratic norms); Seidenfeld, supra note
339 (arguing that "[a] dministrative agencies ... fall between the extremes of the
politically over-responsive Congress and the over-insulated courts" and arguing that
agencies are legitimate in their ability to best engage in deliberative decision-making
bounded by judicial review and review by "politically accountable" Congress, among
other factors such as agency policymaking processes).
341 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
342 See, e.g., Livermore, supra note 8, at 676-89 (noting potentially negative
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arises where there are concerns about races to the bottom.3 43 But there
is a greater risk that if the federal government experiments - and even
when it differentiates policies among regions - the effects of
experimental policy will be allocated along politicized lines, with
favored states becoming the experimental sites for policies deemed
likely to succeed, or disfavored states serving as guinea pigs for long-
shot innovations. Though it does not arise from a policy
experimentation context, Florida's recent special treatment in offshore
drilling policy readily illustrates the potential political problems.344
Where that threat arises, and where traditional politics are not sufficient
to check it, requiring some degree of state and local involvement in
experimental policymaking can protect against federal politicization of
the spoils of experimentation.
C. Resources
Effective experimentation also requires a massive amount of
resources, and here, too, the federal government often has an
advantage. Because of the deep and broad bureaucratic structures at
the federal level, in numerous policy areas the federal government can
often contribute more expertise, money, and labor than its state and
local counterparts. Both the soil and fire examples illustrate this point.
As shown by our USDA case study, when there was relatively broad
public support for enhanced federal involvement in a policy area and
funding to match this support, the federal government deployed its
extensive resources at the most local of levels, sending government
scientists around the country to set up and run agricultural
experiment stations.345 The Civilian Conservation Corps also helped to
carry out the experiments - installing the metal vats that collected
soil to measure the effectiveness of conservation approaches;
disseminating the proven approaches, such as tree planting; and
consequences of state experimentation with water quality).
343 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1212 (1977).
344 See Matt Pearce & Gray Rohrer, Democrats on both Coasts Cry Foul after Trump
Exempts Florida from Oil-Drilling Plan, CAP. GAZETTE (Jan. 9, 2018, 9:10 PM),
http://www.capitalgazette.com/la-na-trump-oil-drilling-florida-20180109-story.html
(detailing states' objections after the Trump administration "exempted Florida from
expanded offshore drilling . . . without offering similar exemptions to other coastal
states").
345 The government did, however, typically rely on donation of state lands, and
later partnered with the states to conduct the experiments.
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providing seeds and labor, on thousands of individual farms.346 Later
on, even when federal resources diminished somewhat, the
government's role in soil conservation policy and experimentation
remained quite sticky. There are still USDA field offices and thousands
of USDA staff operating around the country, continuing the effort to
demonstrate conservation practices within communities and
encourage farmers to adopt them.34 7 The forest fire management case
study also demonstrates that the federal government can provide not
just the staffing, but also the medium in which the experiment plays
out - in that case, the vast reserves of federally-owned land and trees
necessary to investigate varied management practices. And in the Jobs-
Plus example, the federal government used federally-funded housing
projects as the experimental medium, although it relied heavily on the
local actors who run these projects to implement the experiment and
help collect data.
The federal government will not always have this advantage. As the
Race to the Top example illustrates, there are some policy realms in
which state and local governments have a near-monopoly on facilities
and staff. As scholars of the policy experimentalism field note, the
medium of experimentation, or the "units of randomization," vary
substantially; while some experiments have occurred in federally-
funded housing developments, others have played out in hospitals,348
doctors' family practices,349 and local public schools.350 Often, this will
simply be an accident of federalism and path dependence -
346 See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
347 See Local Service Centers Directory, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/contact/local/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2018) (providing the location and contact information of USDA Service
Centers).
348 See, e.g., Laura C. Leviton & Jeffrey D. Horbar, Cluster Randomized Trials for the
Evaluation of Strategies Designed to Promote Evidence Based Practice in Perinatal and
Neonatal Medicine, 599 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 94, 96-97 (2005)
(describing a policy experiment to improve caregivers' implementation of more
effective treatment practices - altering "medical practice to be consistent with the
evidence" - in which the units of study were hospitals).
349 Jeremy Grimshaw et al., Cluster Randomized Trials of Professional and
Organizational Behavior Change Interventions in Health Care Settings, 599 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 71, 78 (2005) (describing a policy trial examining the extent to
which medical research results are incorporated in to practice and the use of the
"family practice" as the level at which to randomize the trial).
350 See, e.g., Brian R. Flay et al., Effects of 2 Prevention Programs on High-Risk
Behaviors Among African-American Youth, 158 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 377
(2004) (describing a randomized policy trial that involved public schools and the
communities in which they were located).
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governments at the local, state, regional, or federal levels will have
built up expertise and resources in a particular area simply because
they historically exercised the most responsibility in that particular
field. Consequently, in designing an experiment in a particular policy
area, officials should pay close attention to the government level or
levels with the most amassed resources and expertise in this area. But
often, that level will be federal. And even when money, expertise, and
labor tend to be concentrated at a lower level, the federal government
can also leverage those resources and help to coordinate them. In the
education area, states and school districts collect most of the funds
that support education and employ nearly all of the people involved in
the education system.351 Yet by granting funds based on a checklist of
factors that states and local governments could experiment with, and
enlisting experts to periodically check in with states and school
districts and making them talk to each other on conference calls, the
federal government helped to differentiate the experimental approach,
collect important data, and spread lessons learned.352
We make no claim, of course, that the federal government should
always be a part of policy experiments. Some of the benefits of
centralized coordination can be reproduced in the interactions
between local governments and states, and the federal government
need not always take the lead.353 And often policy entrepreneurs
cannot wait for the perfect institutional arrangements to arise. If the
federal government is uninterested in supporting an effort at policy
reform, as it sometimes will be, the more sensible course will be to
proceed with those governmental entities whose leaders are willing to
innovate, even if they would not be central players in an idealized
experimental effort. Our core claim, instead, is that, as our examples
show, the federal government has been, and should continue to be, a
key player in policy experimentation. As legislators, executive branch
officials, and judges adjust the boundaries of federal and state power,
they should bear that lesson in mind.
35t The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEPT. EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/fed/role.html (last modified May 25, 2017) (explaining that "the Federal
contribution to elementary and secondary education is about [eight] percent" of total
budgets); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (describing
education as "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments").
352 See supra notes 279, 286 and accompanying text.
353 See Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, supra note 66.
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It is also worth noting that there are political, economic, and other
reasons that explain why relatively rigorous, federally-led
experimentation seems to dominate some policy areas - such as
agriculture - but not others, such as water pollution control?3 And
perhaps some areas are more conducive to federal experimentation
than others, as Michael Livermore has noted.355 There is a large
literature on the drivers of and hurdles to decentralized
experimentation,356 but the motivations for federal experimentation
remain somewhat of a mystery. As we note in the agricultural case
study, Congress requires evidence of the results of agricultural
conservation programs and incorporation of this evidence into
improved policy. 357 This might have resulted from a relatively
straightforward desire to ensure that federal funds are spent in the
most efficient and effective way possible, or more politically-motivated
purposes, such as demonstrating positive results for powerful
agricultural interest groups within House and Senate members' home
jurisdictions. Congress similarly at least paid lip-service to
experimentation in certain recent educational initiatives. But why
would Congress not require the same type of experimentation in the
many other areas in which it doles out funds? One might expect that
the federal government would feel the most freedom to risk
experimentation in areas where there is less risk of backlash from
powerful stakeholders. The case studies above suggest that federal
experimentation occurs both in areas of relatively strong stakeholder
influence, such as agriculture, and somewhat more neutral areas, such
as forest fire policy.358 But the agricultural experimentation appears to
occur primarily within the area of conservation funding, and not, for
example, the more politically-charged, stakeholder-dominated aspects
354 See, e.g., Livermore, supra note 8, at 681-83 (describing limited
experimentation, as well as certain limits on experimental opportunities, in this area
and noting that "[m] ore constrained federal jurisdiction would reduce the ability of
EPA to develop complementary policies to encourage innovation on the part of the
states").
355 See id. at 676-88 (describing why reduced federal jurisdiction would not likely
lead to beneficial decentralized experimentation in the water pollution context).
356 See supra notes 5-6.
357 See supra note 217.
358 There are, of course, numerous stakeholders concerned about forest fires, such
as landowners who live on the urban-suburban edge, ranchers, state emergency
response officials, and others. See Bradshaw, supra note 259, 451-66 (2010)
(describing the stakeholders). But these stakeholders do not seem as organized or
well-funded as the powerful agricultural lobby.
1190 [Vol. 52:1119
Federal Laboratories of Democracy
of agricultural policy such as crop insurance or fertilizer subsidies.359
Thus, freedom from traditional "capture" might be part of the story.
CONCLUSION
For decades, American political discourse has placed a premium on
policy experimentation. Sometimes, that emphasis may go too far; not
every policy experiment is a worthy expenditure of public resources or
is carried out for salutary ends.360 But experimentation is often useful.
To the extent that experimentation is an important value of our
governance systems, it makes sense to ask what government structures
will produce good experiments. Because American governance is
inextricably intertwined with federalism, the answers to that question
necessitate an inquiry into the intersection of policy experimentalism
and federalist governance.
That inquiry, as this Article has shown, leads to an unexpected
outcome. The federal government, we have argued, has been and
should be at the center of experimentalist policy. It also should
sometimes be at the geographic periphery; in addition to coordinating
experiments and communicating their results, federal staff across the
nation sometimes should also carry them out. We make no claim that
this will always be true; there is no single magic formula for
experimentation. But as our examples show, the often-important
federal role deserves greater attention. And in a world of growing calls
for broad-based federal deregulation, the importance of the federal
government in supporting a central value of federalism should not be
overlooked. There is ample room, in other words, for additional use
of, and inquiry into, our federal laboratories of democracy.
359 See, e.g., Linda Breggin & D. Bruce Myers, Jr., Subsidies with Responsibilities:
Placing Stewardship and Disclosure Conditions on Government Payments to Large-Scale
Commodity Crop Operations, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 515-21 (2013) (describing
the subsidy programs).
360 See generally Livermore, supra note 8 (discussing downsides of experimental
policy). In a recent example of a dangerous and deeply problematic application of
federal laboratories, the Trump Administration ran what it called a "pilot program" for
separating immigrant children from their families at the federal government's
immigration center in El Paso, Texas, in 2017, before the official "zero tolerance"
program was implemented. See Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Trump
Admin Ran 'Pilot Program' for Separating Migrant Families in 2017, NBC NEWS (June
29, 2018, 1:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-
crisis/trump-admin-ran-pilot-program-separating-migrant-families-
2017-n887616.
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